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ABSTRACT
The purpose of my study is to better understand the current obstacles in estab-
lishing a functional environmental market. In the dissertation, I study this problem
from both supply and demand sides; that is, I consider the available actions from the
environmental credit suppliers, such as landowners or farmers, under different mar-
ket institutions, and I also study the buyers’ behaviors for a potential environmental
market for a public good, such as private individuals who hold positive values toward
various types of ecosystem services.
I mainly address two questions. The first question is how to raise revenue from pri-
vate individuals to support an environmental market, which is discussed extensively
in the first chapter. I investigate new auction approaches to support an environmen-
tal market, focusing on the differences in individuals’ contribution behaviors when
they are asked to support a public or common good in different auction approaches.
Experimental results show that the proposed auction approaches can significantly in-
crease the realized social surplus compared to the traditional pay-your-bids approach.
ii
The second question is called the “credit-stacking” problem, which concerns suppliers’
choices and participation constraints when multiple environmental markets are to be
established. Since environmental markets may be established at different scales (e.g.,
regional or global), I propose to study the impact of credit stacking when multiple en-
vironmental markets, including a regional and a global environmental market, coexist.
I also study credit suppliers’ behavioral responses in different market institutions (or
different policies, such as when credit stacking is allowed versus the situation when
credit stacking is not allowed). In particular, I study how the behavioral responses of
producers in the long run will influence the policy outcomes. I find that not allowing
credit stacking is a substantial restriction against achieving social optimality and the
social inefficiency loss due to such restriction could be magnified in the long run. My
research on credit stacking policy is discussed in the second and third chapters.
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Chapter 1
Providing Multiple Units of a
Public Good Using Individualized
Price Auctions: Experimental
Evidence
1.1 Introduction
Theoretical and experimental economists continue to pursue better understanding
of the factors affecting incentives, choices, or behaviors that manifests free riding.
Classical examples of public good provision include the construction of lighthouses
to navigate ships, or building the “optimal” number of street lightings (Coase, 1974).
Since uncoordinated individuals often fail to provide, or fall short of providing, the
public good at a socially optimal level, researchers have sought to correct the under-
provision problem by designing different provision mechanisms. An example is the
widely known Vickery-Clark-Groves (VCG) mechanism, under which individuals are
1
2incentivized (though weakly) to truthfully reveal their values for the public good
(Vickrey, 1961; Clarke, 1971; Groves, 1973). However, the VCG mechanism is not
budget-balancing and the auctioneer may face significant loss (Green and Laffont,
1979). Economists have demonstrated that theoretically, no other incentive mech-
anism can yield a higher expected social surplus than the VCG mechanism, thus
making the mission of developing for an “ideal” implementation mechanism difficult
(Gibbard, 1973). On the other hand, economists started to pursue Pareto improve-
ments in a public good setting a long time ago. Expanding our current knowledge
on provision mechanisms to mitigate market failures around public goods relative to
various contexts can be helpful. Motivated by Lindahl (1919) and the more struc-
tured presentation from Samuelson (1954, 1955), we design several individualized
price auction mechanisms and find these mechanisms can potentially increase social
efficiency compared to existing public good provision mechanisms empirically, even
though they lack incentive compatibility in theory. We widen the scope for practical
Lindahl pricing by experimentally testing the effectiveness of several individualized
price auctions (IPA) in delivering multiple units of a threshold public good.
The auction for multiple units of a private good has been studied extensively,
motivated by the Federal Communications Commission spectrum auctions (Cramton,
1997; McAfee and McMillan, 1996) as well as the treasure auction (Cammack, 1991).
Ausubel (2004) proposes an efficient ascending-bid auction for multiple homogenous
objects that mitigate the Winner’s Curse problem from the Vickrey auction for private
goods (Vickrey, 1961). In the Ausubel auction, the auctioneer first calls a price,
contributors respond to the price with a quantity at that price, then the process
iterates through increasing prices until there is no excess demand. A contributor pays
the last announced price if the aggregated demand of other contributor’s is less than
3the supply. Manelli et al. (2006) compared the Vickrey auction and Ausubel ascending
auction experimentally, with common value components in individuals’ valuations.
Results show that under the common value case, the Vickrey auction is more efficient
while the revenues are higher in the Ausubel auction. Based on a single set up
with two units and two bidders, Engelmann and Grimm (2009) provide laboratory
experiment results for five different multi-unit private good auctions.1 Van Essen
(2010) generalizes Ausubel’s ascending auction to a public good environment and
shows that in theory, truthful revelation of preferences is possible in a dynamic setting
with a moderate information requirement.
Our proposed IPA mechanisms include the market clearing rule and the pricing
rule. The marketing clearing rule determines whether we settle the auction starting
from the first unit forward (Ascending-Unit Auction, or the AU) or starting from the
last available unit backward (Descending-Unit Auction, or the DU). The pricing rule
includes the pay-your-bids rule where each individual pays the amount she bids on
all units provided, the marginal bid pricing rule where each individual pays her bid
on the marginal unit (the last unit provided by the group) as well as all the other
units provided, and the marginal pivotal pricing rule, where each individual pays her
pivotal price on the marginal unit for all units provided. Our results suggest that the
marginal pricing rules (both the marginal bid pricing and the marginal pivotal pricing)
realize a higher social surplus compared to the pay-your-bids, non-marginal pricing
rule. Our experimental results also show that the improvement in social surplus
can be quite substantial and can be as high as 31% in the Ascending-Unit Auction
using marginal bid pricing rule. The Descending-Unit Auctions do not perform better
1Five auciton mechanisms tested include Uniform-Price Sealed-Bid Auction, Uniform-Price Open
Auction, Discriminatory Auction, Vickrey Auction and Ausubel Auction.
4than the Ascending-Unit Auctions due to significantly lower group contribution (more
near-zero individual bids) on the first two units when six units are available for the
group to support in total.
Our research is primarily motivated by the problem of searching for a simple, yet
effective way to establish markets for previously non-marketable public goods. In
environmental economics, payment for ecosystem services (PES) has been promoted
as a promising way to protect and enhance ecosystem functions (Go´mez-Baggethun
et al., 2010; Farley and Costanza, 2010; Guerry et al., 2015). The U.S. Department of
Agriculture established its Office for Environmental Markets in response to the 2008
Farm Bill. A desired PES mechanism shall improve the efficiency of the provision
of various types of ecosystem services and environmental benefits, which are often
public goods. The provision of ecosystem services are typically funded by govern-
ment through distortionary taxes or through regulations. In this paper, we envision
a decentralized market where the public could pay such positive externalities individ-
ually. A successful and functional ecosystem service market shall induce individuals
to ”buy” specific types of ecosystem services toward which they hold positive values
(Uchida et al., 2007; Swallow et al., 2008). Due to the existence of free riding in-
centives, ordinary direct payment often results in insufficient public funds; that is,
individuals may pay less than their true value for environmental benefits. In our con-
text, we consider a public good that is provided in discrete units due to constraints
on nature’s production. We extend the Lindahl (1919) approach to the provision
of multiple units of a threshold public good and then characterize some important
features regarding this approach.
Nonetheless, the IPA mechanisms can have much wider applicability than defin-
ing the payment for environmental markets. For examples, recent development in the
5“crowdfunding” industry has encouraged private provision from many individuals to
donate over the internet towards a common service or a research project. In crowd-
funding projects, a minimum startup cost is required and thus the total contribution
needs to reach a certain threshold to provide the service or project, while such service
or project can be further enhanced or expanded if the total contribution reaches a
higher targeted level. In our context, the expansion of a particular project can be
considered as the provision of an additional unit of pubic good. Our IPA mechanisms
can be applied to facilitate these and other fundraising activities where the project
or service carries public good properties in general.
There are few experimental studies on the multiple units public good provision.
Bagnoli et al. (1992) investigates the public goods provision in a multiple units con-
text and compares experimental results with theoretical predictions. Corazzini et al.
(2015) conducted public good experiments that were motivated by charitable contri-
butions to investigate the effect of the charity number on individual donation. Liu et
al. (2016) study the provision of multiple units of a threshold public good with differ-
ent group structures combined with rebate rules. Our framework is similar to Bagnoli
et al. (1992) where individuals are asked to provide multiple units of a threshold pub-
lic good through private contributions. As envisioned from Lindahl’s framework, the
IPA mechanisms are intended to resolve the price and quantity endogenously, with a
minimum of a priori information about the likely equilibrium in supply and demand.
This paper focuses on the pragmatic issues that are of potential interest to en-
vironmental market proposers, charity organizations, and crowdfunding companies.
We do not fully characterize equilibrium individual bidding strategies under differ-
ent mechanisms; such exercises can be enormously useful for developing alternative
market institutions that can accommodate the provision of multiples units or levels
6of public goods. As a first step, we focus on the revenue and efficiency comparisons
among different provision mechanisms through a sequence of lab experiments. One
of the central issues surrounding the multiple units of a private good (i.e., divisible
good) is the revenue comparison between the discriminatory and uniform price auc-
tions. The discriminatory auction has been the most widely used in practice, though
the U.S. started adopting uniform-price auctions for Treasury Bonds. In this sense,
our pay-your-bids (or the “pay-as-bid” in some literature) pricing rule is essentially
the discriminatory price auction used in auctions for private divisible goods, while our
marginal bid pricing rule resembles the uniform-price auctions studied in auctions for
private divisible goods. We further explore a new version of the uniform-price auc-
tion where individuals pay only the pivotal price on the marginal unit for all units
provided, which we call the marginal pivotal price auction. In the discriminatory
auction, different prices are paid for by the same individual for different units (e.g.,
see Bartolini and Cottarelli (1997) for a survey study on the use of discriminatory
auction used in selling Treasure Bonds). In a uniform-price auction, each individual
pays the same price for the price calculated for the marginal unit. In the private
divisible good case, Hortacsu and McAdams (2010) find that switching from a dis-
criminatory auction to a uniform price (or the Vickrey auction) would not increase
the seller’s revenue significantly, while the bidders’ expected surplus can increase no
more than 0.02% from a structural model followed by the counterfactual analyses.
Researchers are primarily concerned with the seller’s revenue in private multiunit
auctions. Theoretically, the seller’s revenue in the private good auction context be-
tween the discriminatory and uniform price auction might depend on the realization
of bidder valuations (Ausubel and Cramton, 2004). Several papers have also devel-
oped empirical strategies to address the discreteness problem when comparing the
7seller’s revenue (Wolak, 2007; Kastl, 2011). In our paper, we place equal emphasis on
the consumers’ (or the bidders’) surplus, the seller’s (or the producer’s) net revenue as
well as the overall social efficiency. Our paper tests several comparable mechanisms
in providing a public good and find the marginal bid rule (similar to the uniform price
in the private good case) can significantly increase the total social surplus.
The paper is organized as follow. Section 2 describes the provision mechanisms.
Section 3 discusses contribution incentives and offers several numerical examples for
selected provision mechanisms. Section 4 describes the experimental designs and pro-
cedures. Section 5 presents the experimental results and discusses their implications.
Section 6 concludes.
1.2 Provision Mechanisms
The IPA mechanisms include two components: 1) the market clearing rule, which
determines whether a unit of the public good is provided as well as the number of
units that can be provided, and 2) the pricing rule, which determines how much each
individual has to pay based on her or others’ bid(s). Assume that in our context,
there are I individuals asked to support a total of up to J units of public good
with constant marginal cost C through voluntary contributions.2 Each individual is
indexed by i ∈ {1, ..., I}, and each unit of the public good is indexed by j ∈ {1, ..., J}.
Individuals are asked to bid toward each unit of the public good simultaneously. Let
vji be the individual i’s value toward public good unit j. Individual i’s net profit is
denoted as pii. Thus, we can express the total bids on unit j as Bj =
∑
i b
j
i . Similar to
2We assume constant provision cost for simplicity. Our methods can be easily generalized to
an increasing marginal provision cost or a decreasing marginal provision cost. However, the social
welfare implication, especially the allocation of the realized social surplus would differ.
8a multi-units auction in a private good setting (Vickrey, 1961), we assume that each
individual has a non-decreasing marginal value for each unit of public good. Thus,
for all individuals, the marginal benefit curve satisfies vki ≥ vji whenever k < j.
Below we propose two market clearing rules and two pricing rules that constitute
the framework of the individualized price auctions. For comparison purposes, we
use the pay-your-bids mechanism as the baseline, where each individual simply pays
the amount they offer to contribute to each unit that is delivered. The pay-your-
bids approach has been studied in past experiments. For example, Bagnoli et al.
(1992) provide the experimental results on multiple units public good provision using
a similar pay-your-bids mechanism and find that the overall contributions do not
comply with the successively undominated perfect equilibrium (Bagnoli and Lipman,
1989), which is a refined equilibrium solution concept that eliminates inefficient Nash
equilibria. Our market clearing rules and pricing rules create an IPA that differs
from the pay-your-bids approach studied by Bagnoli et al. (1992), though such rules
are built within the provision point framework (with a money back guarantee on
non-provided units) for a multiple units environment.
1.2.1 Market Clearing Rules
The market clearing rule determines whether each unit of the public good is provided,
and therefore the number of public good units provided, depending on the group
contribution profile.
9Ascending-Unit Auction (AU)
In the ascending-unit auction, we compare the total bids from a group of individuals
with the cost of the public good, starting from the first unit. If a group’s total offers
on the first unit is higher or equals to the cost of the first unit, we continue to compare
the total offer on the second unit with the cost of the second unit, and so on. We
will stop when the total offer for a unit is smaller than the unit cost. For example,
if the total offer on the first unit, second unit and third unit are all higher than the
cost, but the total offer on the fourth unit is smaller than cost of the fourth unit, we
will provide three units. Therefore, the ascending-unit rule can be mathematically
expressed as
g =
{
0 if B1 < C
j if Bk ≥ C,Bj+1 < C, ∀k ≤ j, (1.1)
where Bk =
∑
i b
k
i . Note that in order to provide j units, the total offer on each
of the units 1, 2, ..., j must be higher than the corresponding unit cost; otherwise,
the auction process will stop when the total offer of a unit falls below the cost.
Descending-Unit Auction (DU)
In the descending-unit auction, we compare the total bids from a group with the cost
of the public good, starting from the last unit available, the unit J. If the group’s total
offer on the last unit is higher or equal to the cost for the last unit, we will provide
all J units; if the total offer is smaller than the cost of the last unit, we will move on
to compare the total offer on the second-to-last unit, or the unit J-1, with the cost of
that unit, we will provide all J-1 units if the total offer is higher and continue to the
(J-2)th unit if we fail, and so on. We will stop when the total offer for a unit is at
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least as large as the unit cost. For example, if the total offer on the Jth unit, (J-1)th
unit and (J-2)th unit are all lower than the cost, but the offer on the (J-3)th unit is
larger than its cost, we will provide J-3 units in total. Therefore, the number of units
provided by the group is
g =
{
0 if Bk < C, ∀k ≤ J
j if Bj ≥ C,Bk < C, ∀k > j (1.2)
with Bk =
∑
i b
k
i . Comparing the AU auction and the DU auction, we find that
if K units of public good are provided in the AU auction, at least K units will be
provided in the DU auction, assuming the same group contribution profile; the reverse
if not true as the AU auction requires a more stringent condition to provide more
units. For example, consider the profile of total offers on 5 units of public good
is {60, 40, 20, 30, 10}, and the cost is constant at 30; 2 units of public good can be
supported from the AU while 4 units can be supported from the DU auction.
1.2.2 Pricing Rules
Pricing rules determine individual cost and payoff. We consider three pricing rules:
the first one is called the pay-your-bids auction, wherein each individual pays exactly
the amount she bids when a unit is provided. This pricing rule is similar to the
provision point mechanism (with no rebate and with money back guarantee) in a
single unit provision (Marks and Croson, 1998; Spencer et al., 2009; Rondeau et al.,
1999, 2005). The second pricing rule is the individualized price auction using marginal
bids, wherein each individual pays the same price for all the units provided, and the
price equals one’s bid on the last unit provided. The third is the individualized price
auction using the marginal pivotal price, wherein each individual still pays the same
11
price for all the units provided, however, the price is now based on the pivotal price
calculated from the last unit provided. In all cases, the last unit j provided is given
the application of equation (1.1) or (1.2) , such that g = j or g = 0 .
Pay-your-bids Auction (PYB)
In the PYB rule, each individual pays exactly the amount she bids if a unit is provided.
Let ti denote the amount an individual has to pay contingent on the number of units
being provided. Then, we have:
ti =
{
0 if g = 0∑g
k=1 b
k
i if g = j.
(1.3)
Individualized Price Auction Using Marginal Bid Price (MBP)
In the MBP rule, each individual pays the same price for all units provided, and the
price equals one’s bid on the last unit that the group can collectively deliver. Let ti
denote the amount an individual has to pay contingent on the number of units being
provided. Then we have:
ti =
{
0 if g = 0
j ∗ bji if g = j.
(1.4)
Individualized Price Auction Using Marginal Pivotal Price (MPP)
In the MPP rule, each individual pays the same price for each unit provided. However,
different from MBP, the price is not directly determined by one’s bid on the marginal
unit. Instead, the price is calculated according to the pivotal mechanism, where
individual i either pays nothing or the amount just needed to cover the cost. Let ti
12
denote the amount an individual has to pay contingent on the number of units being
provided; we have:
ti =
{
0 if g = 0
j ∗max (0, C −∑k 6=i bjk) if g = j. (1.5)
1.3 Properties of Different Mechanisms
1.3.1 Individual Profit
An individual’s profit equals the total realized value minus the total cost paid, de-
pending on the number of units that the group provides. Let pii denote individual i’s
profit, then
pii =
{
0 if g = 0∑g
k=1 v
k
i − ti if g = j. (1.6)
Next we compare individual i’s profit for 1) PYB, the pay-your-bid auction; 2)
MBP-AU, the ascending-unit marginal bid auction; 3) MBP-DU, the descending-
unit marginal bid auction; 4)MPP-AU, the ascending-unit pivotal price auction; 5)
MPP-DU, the descending-unit pivotal price auction. The MBP-AU (MBP-DU) is the
individualized price auction using the marginal bid price combined with the ascending-
unit (descending-unit) market clearing rule, while the MPP-AU (MPP-DU) is the in-
dividualized price auction using the marginal pivotal price combined with ascending-
unit (descending-unit) market clearing rule. Profit functions are specified according
to equation (1.6) by plugging in respective market clearing rules and pricing rules.
Denote the bi = {b1i ...bJi } and b−i = {b11...bJ1 ...b1i−1, b2i−1...bJi−1...b1i+1, b2i+1...bJi+1...}. In-
dividual i’s profit is maximized when (assume g > 0)
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bi
∗ ∈ arg max pii = arg max
g(bi,b−i)∑
k=1
vki − ti(bi,b−i))
 . (1.7)
Note that ti(·) is also a function of b−i when the marginal pivotal pricing is used;
otherwise, individual i’s total private cost ti(·) is of a function only her own bids
bi. Similarly, the total realized social surplus (RSS), consumers’ surplus (CS) and
producers’ net revenue (PNR) can be expressed as
RSS =
N∑
i=1
g(bi,b−i)∑
k=1
vki − g(bi,b−i)C, (1.8)
CS =
N∑
i=1
g(bi,b−i)∑
k=1
(vki − bki ), (1.9)
and
PNR =
N∑
i=1
g(bi,b−i)∑
k=1
bki − g(bi,b−i)C. (1.10)
1.3.2 Examples
We further explain the individualized price auction mechanisms using several nu-
merical examples. Assume there are 3 contributors and 6 units available. Their
values and bids on each unit are specified according to Table 1.1 . For example,
from Table 1.1 , Contributor 1’s value for the first unit is v11 = 24, and Contributor
1’s bid for the first unit is b11 = 18. The unit cost is 30 and the same for every
unit. Each contributor’s value decreases as the unit number increases, which indi-
cates a decreasing marginal benefit curve. Since the total value on the fourth unit is∑
i v
4
i = v
4
1 + v
4
2 + v
4
3 = 14 + 10 + 8 = 32 > 30, while the total value on the fifth unit
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is
∑
i v
5
i = v
5
1 + v
5
2 + v
5
3 = 8 + 4 + 6 = 18 < 30. Thus, it is socially optimal to provide
4 units.
According to the AU rule, only 3 units will be provided since the total of bids
on each of the first three units is higher than the cost (B1 = b
1
1 + b
1
2 + b
1
3 = 18 +
18 + 18 = 54 > 30, B2 = b
2
1 + b
2
2 + b
2
3 = 9 + 18 + 11 = 38 > 30, B3 = b
3
1 + b
3
2 + b
3
3 =
8 + 13 + 10 = 31 > 30), while the total of bids on the 4th unit is smaller than its
cost (B4 = b
4
1 + b
4
2 + b
4
3 = 5 + 10 + 7 = 22 < 30). Thus, the 4th unit is not provided,
though providing the fourth unit could realize a higher social surplus.
Under the PYB, Contributors 1, 2 and 3 respectively obtain profit:
pi1 = v
1
1 + v
2
1 + v
3
1 − b11 − b21 − b31 = 23;
pi2 = v
1
2 + v
2
2 + v
3
1 − b12 − b22 − b32 = 4;
pi3 = v
1
3 + v
2
3 + v
3
3 − b13 − b23 − b33 = 2.
Under the MBP-AU, the respective profit profile becomes:
pi1 = v
1
1 + v
2
1 + v
3
1 − 3 ∗ b31 = 34;
pi2 = v
1
2 + v
2
2 + v
3
1 − 3 ∗ b32 = 14;
pi3 = v
1
3 + v
2
3 + v
3
3 − 3 ∗ b33 = 12.
Under the MPP-AU, the profit profile is:
pi1 = v
1
1 + v
2
1 + v
3
1 − 3 ∗max(0, C − b32 − b33) = 36;
pi2 = v
1
2 + v
2
2 + v
3
1 − 3 ∗max(0, C − b31 − b33) = 17;
pi3 = v
1
3 + v
2
3 + v
3
3 − 3 ∗max(0, C − b31 − b32) = 15.
Note that the DU auctions will still provide 3 units according to the value and
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bid profile in Table 1.1 . We first evaluate the bids on the 6th unit; we find that
B6 = 4 < 30. We then evaluate the bids on the 5th unit and find B5 = 21. We
continue this process until we find B3 = 31 > 30. Thus, 3 units will be provided
using the DU auctions. The profit for MBP-DU(MPP-DU) is calculated the same
way as MBP-AU(MPP-AU) when the number of units provided is the same.
1.3.3 Theoretical Remarks
Contribution Incentives at the Margin
In a multiple units public good environment, Nash equilibrium seldom leads to a
socially efficient outcome. Even if we try to predict the outcome with stricter solu-
tion concepts (Bagnoli and Lipman, 1989), experimental results show that a refined
Nash solution concept does not match outcomes very well (Bagnoli et al., 1992),
possibly due to restrictive assumptions required for the equilibrium solutions. Prac-
tically, contributors often have limited information about others’ value, which makes
the characterization of the equilibrium strategies very complicated and analytically
intractable in a multiple units public good context. While a complete equilibrium
characterization would be interesting, it remains outside the scope of the current pa-
per. As a result, we focus on the incentives for contribution at the margin (Marks
and Croson, 1998). Specifically, we compare the differences in the marginal cost of
providing an additional unit.
Note that individual i’s bid bji on unit j enters the payoff function only if the
jth unit can be provided. The marginal benefit of providing one additional unit, j,
equals vji for all mechanisms; however, the individual’s marginal cost varies due to
the difference in the pricing rules.
16
In PYB, the individual marginal cost of providing one additional unit (the cost
difference in providing j units and providing j − 1 units) is
MCPY B,i = b
j
i ,
since if the jth unit is provided, the total payment increases by bji . In MBP-AU (or
MBP-DU), individual i’s marginal cost of providing one additional unit is
MCMBP,i = b
j
i + (j − 1)(bji − bj−1i ),
since if the jth unit is provided, i’s total payment increases by jbji − (j − 1)bj−1i
compared to when only j − 1 units are provided.
The above marginal cost results suggest one potential advantage of the MBP ap-
proach is that it reduces the marginal cost of providing one additional unit compared
to PYB when individuals lower their bids with a decreasing marginal value for more
units. However, a $1 reduction in bji can reduce the marginal cost by more than a $1
under MBP, compared to an exact $1 reduction in the marginal cost under PYB. Such
cost saving opportunities in MBP become more larger as j increases. For example,
a $1 reduction in bji can reduce the marginal cost by $1× 2 = $2 if j = 2, while the
same $1 reduction can lower the marginal cost by $1× 4 = $4 for the marginal unit
if j = 4 under MBP. Therefore, we expect the advantage of lowering marginal cost
using MBP gradually diminishes as the unit number j increases.
In MPP-AU (or MPP-DU), the marginal cost of providing one additional unit is
MCMPP,i = max(0, C−
∑
k 6=i
bjk)+(j−1)
(
max(0, C −
∑
k 6=i
bjk)−max(0, C −
∑
k 6=i
bj−1k )
)
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when the jth unit is provided. Depending on whether i’s bid is pivotal, the above
equation can be written as:
MCMPP,i =

0 if
∑
k 6=i b
j−1
k ≥ C,
∑
k 6=i b
j
k ≥ C; (a)
−(j − 1)(C −∑k 6=i bj−1k ) if ∑k 6=i bj−1k < C,∑k 6=i bjk ≥ C; (b)
j(C −∑k 6=i bjk) if ∑k 6=i bj−1k ≥ C,∑k 6=i bjk < C; (c)
C −∑k 6=i bjk + (j − 1)∑k 6=i(bj−1k − bjk) if ∑k 6=i bj−1k < C,∑k 6=i bjk < C; (d)
(1.11)
The payoff function for MPP is complicated. Under the MPP rule, individual i’s
cost of providing the unit j is not influenced by bji directly. However, i’s bids on unit
j − 1 and j will determine if i’s bid is pivotal to the provision success. Note that if
individual i’s bid bji is not pivotal (on unit j with
∑
k 6=i b
j
k ≥ C), the marginal cost
of providing the unit j is zero or even negative (i.e., equation 1.11(a) and 1.11(b)).
Realistically, as the group’s offers gradually decrease with a smaller aggregated value,
one’s bid is more likely to be pivotal and individual i’s payoff is then determined by
either equation 1.11(c) or 1.11(d). The marginal cost of providing unit j implied by
1.11(c) can be relatively high since the cost of providing j−1 units is zero when the jth
unit is provided. The marginal cost MCMPP,i implied by 1.11(d) cannot be directly
compared toMCPY B,i orMCMBP,i since C−
∑
k 6=i b
j
k < b
j
i but
∑
k 6=i b
j−1
k −
∑
k 6=i b
j
k > 0
when the group contribution decreases with the unit number.
The above analyses compare the marginal cost of providing an additional unit.
Compared to the PYB auctions, the MBP auctions offer a “rebate” on inframarginal
unit k(k < j) determined by the difference between bji and b
k
i ; the MPP auctions
partially separate marginal cost from one’s own bid on the marginal unit.3 Besides
the marginal contribution incentives, we are interested in which of the mechanism
3In MPP auctions, individual i’s contribution can still influence one’s profit as it will determines
if the marginal (as well the inframarginal) contribution is pivotal to the provision success.
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can yield a higher social efficiency in a multiple units public good environment. Thus
we proceed to discuss the efficiency implications as well the surplus allocation.
Pareto Optimal Provision and Surplus Allocation
We assume there is a market-maker or a social planner who is able to establish
mechanisms to collect revenue and provide units of public good. We refer to the
market-maker or the social planner as the public good “producer” in order to separate
this agent from the contributors, who we call “consumers.” We are interested in the
realized social surplus, as well as the split of the social surplus between consumers
and producers (e.g., the market-maker or the social planner). We graphically present
the social surplus between consumers and the producer, with a focus on different ways
to allocate social surplus.
Figure 1.1 illustrates the realized social surplus, consumers’ surplus and producers’
net revenue. The realized social surplus equals the sum of values on each unit provided
minus the total provision cost (i.e., the regions identified by ABEF for realized
social surplus and the regions identified by ABQ′O for the total provision cost in
Figure 1.1 ). The consumers’ surplus equals the sum of values on each unit provided
minus the total bids paid (i.e., the blue regions represented in Figure 1.1 ). The
producers’ net revenue equals the realized social surplus minus consumers’ surplus.
The maximum social surplus equals the sums of values on all units for which aggregate
value (marginal social benefit, MSB) exceeds provision cost minus the total provision
cost if all those units would be delivered. Figure 1.1 (a), 1.1(b) and 1.1(c) respectively
represent the pay-your-bids, individualized price auction using marginal bid price, and
individualized price auction using marginal pivotal price rules.
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In Figure 1.1 , the optimal quantity to be provided from a societal perspective is
denoted by Q∗, which corresponds to the intersection of the marginal social benefit
curve (MSB) and marginal social cost curve (MSC). The actual quantity provided by
the group is denoted by Q′, which corresponds to the intersection of the aggregated
contribution(offer) curve and MSC. The area identified by ACF (and bounded by the
marginal social benefit curve) is the maximum social surplus, denoted by SACF ; the
SABEF is the realized social surplus. Producers’ net revenue equals the total expenses
of the consumers (the red regions in Figure 1.1 ) minus the provision cost. Note that
if we are using the pivotal pricing rule, the producer will either incur a deficit or just
balance the budget. Therefore, when the maximum or realized social surplus is the
same for the different rules,4 the consumers’ surplus (CS) is ranked according to:
CSMPP ≥ CSMBP ≥ CSPY B;
the producers’ net revenue (PNR) is ranked by:
PNRPY B ≥ PNRMBP ≥ 0 ≥ PNRMPP .
1.3.4 The Change of Optimal Unit
In the multiple units public good experiment, the maximum number of units used
by the researcher may serve as a signal on the potentially optimal unit, e.g., in our
experiment, individuals are always asked to bid on 6 units. Thus, a framing effect
4For the illustration in Figure 1.1 , we assume the MSC, MSB, the aggregate bidding curves
are the same across different rules, which also implies the the number of units provided would be
the same. Of course, the different rules may produce different aggregate bidding curves in the
forthcoming experiments.
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potentially exists and may contribute to the differences we observe among treatments
(Ku¨hberger et al., 1999; Sonnemans et al., 1998; Tversky and Kahneman, 1986). In
our case, individuals might view an intermediate unit, say unit 3 or unit 4, as optimal
and may give up efforts on the 5th or the 6th unit. To understand this framing effect,
we include two additional experimental sessions where the provision of all units (6
units) are feasible and socially optimal, by increasing the induced value on each unit
proportionally so that the last unit can always be provided with a positive net social
surplus. These two additional treatments also provide a robustness check on the
consistency of the experimental results when the socially optimal unit changes.
1.4 Experimental Procedure
We conducted eight experimental sessions in the CANR (College of Agriculture and
Natural Resources) at the University of Connecticut (UCONN). Subjects were re-
cruited through the UCONN Daily Digest (http://dailydigest.uconn.edu) where
we placed advertisements asking for volunteer participants in economics experiments.
The specific experimental tasks were not specified in the advertisements to avoid
self-selection. Volunteers contacted researchers by email and received a confirmation
email which only indicated it is an economics experiment involving multiple rounds
of decision making. Our subject pool consists of mostly undergraduates and a few
graduate students from various academic majors, who all expressed a willingness to
participate in economic experiments by replying to the advertisement email. We
checked the participants’ names and email addresses, before confirming their atten-
dance, to ensure each subject participated only once in this sequence of experiments.
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We conducted experiments through networked computer terminals. Inter-participant
communications during the experiment were prohibited and subjects could not ob-
serve each others’ choices.
Subjects who appeared on-time were told that they had already earned a $5 show-
up fee before we proceeded to the instructions. The experiment’s instructions were
read aloud. Subjects were paid in cash once all treatments were finished. One exper-
imental session usually lasted about one hour and twenty minutes with an average
individual payoff around $30. We controlled the total number of subjects to between
10 and 14 for each session with variation arising from individuals who failed to arrive
at the start of each session.
Table 1.2 lists the treatments in the ten experimental sessions. Each treatment is
replicated by at least four distinct groups of individuals. Sessions 1 to 6 compare the
influence of different provision mechanisms; Sessions 7 to 8 change the socially optimal
unit from 4 to 6, using PYB and MBP-AU mechanisms. Our experimental design
responds to Charness et al. (2012)’s suggestions of combining within-subjects and
between-subjects designs to utilize the advantages of both, with a counter-balancing
experiment design to mitigate for order effects
In each session, subjects were assigned to one of two groups and were asked to
make decisions in two treatments. Subjects were required to finish three quizzes
that tested their understanding of the mechanism before making actual decisions in
each treatment. The experiment moderator would then go through the quizzes with
additional explanations of the rules. In each treatment, we separated all the subjects
into two isolated groups. There were 10 decision periods in each treatment.
At the beginning of each decision period, individuals were told their induced values
for six units of the public good. Induced values followed a uniform distribution on
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the interval [20, 24] on Unit 1, [16, 20] on Unit 2, [12, 16] on Unit 3, [8, 12] on Unit 4,
[4, 8] on Unit 5 and [0, 4] on Unit 6 in Sessions 1-6. Individual values in Sessions 7-8
were increased by 8 on average for each unit so that providing all six units would be
the social optimum, e.g., the induced value range is [28, 32] on Unit 1 and [12, 16] on
Unit 4.5 All the induced values are rounded to the nearest tenth in the experiment.
The range of induced values, the provision cost and the number of units are all public
information. We set the provision cost for one unit equal to 8 times the number of all
individuals in a group. Therefore, in Sessions 1-6, it was socially optimal to provide 4
units; in Session 7-8, it was socially optimal to provide 6 units. A total of 98 subjects
participated in the experiment, producing 11,760 individual-unit level observations.
Figure 1.2 shows a screenshot for the input screen. In actual experiments, individuals
face a different induced value and the number of periods is also different than shown
in Figure 1.2 .
1.5 Experiment Result and Discussion
In this section, we present experiment results, focusing on the differences between
the individualized price auction and the pay-your-bids auction. We also discuss the
results when the socially optimal provision unit changes from 4 to 6.
5When providing four units is optimal, the ratios of per unit provision cost over the per unit
expected total benefits (the sum of induced value for a group on one unit) are (from Unit 1 to 6):
36.36%, 44.44%, 57.14%, 80%, 133% and 400%; according to the range on value on each unit, the
ratios of per unit provision cost over the per unit realized total benefits can vary from 33.33% to
40.00%, 40.00% to 50.00%, 50.00% to 66.67%, 66.67% to 100%, 100% to 200% and above 200%,
respectively for Unit 1 to Unit 6. When providing six units is optimal, the ratios of per unit
provision cost over the per unit expected total benefits (from Unit 1 to 6) are: 26.67%, 30.77%,
36.36%, 44.44%, 57.14% and 80%.
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1.5.1 Group Contribution Results
Result 1. Subjects rarely reach the Pareto optimal provision level in all mechanisms.
The MPP-AU has the highest rate, while the PYB has the lowest rate in providing
three or more units, when providing 4 units is optimal.
Table 1.3 reports the provision frequency of each unit for different treatments.
Table 1.4 reports the provision frequency in an accumulative manner: each column
summarizes the provision frequency where at least a certain number of units is pro-
vided. From Table 1.3 and 4, we find that when providing 4 units is optimal, subjects
rarely reach the efficient provision level, except several occasions with the marginal
pivotal pricing rules. Subjects never provide more than 4 units in any cases. When
providing 6 units is optimal, subjects provided 5 units on several occasions, but they
never reached the efficient provision level.6
We find that in the ascending-unit auctions, the pivotal pricing rule performs
best in terms of providing 3 or more units (frequency of providing 3 or more units:
45%) while the marginal bid pricing rule has the lowest complete provision failure
(frequency of providing at least one unit: 96.25%). The difference between pivotal
pricing and marginal bids provision is not obvious in the descending auctions. Com-
pared to the PYB mechanism, all the individualized price mechanisms perform better
in providing 3 or more units, among which the MPP-AU generates the largest increase
is 25% compared to PYB. Due to the limited sample size, we implemented the Fisher’s
exact test for the null hypothesis that the probabilities of providing 3 or more units
6Note that the total benefits on the 4th (or 6th when providing all units is social optimal) unit
are only about 25% higher than the cost on average. This provision cost/benefit ratio is considered
relatively high and successful provision can be difficult even for a single unit (Cadsby and Maynes,
1999).
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are the same under PYB and MPP-AU.7 Our results reject the null hypothesis at a
5% significant level (p = 0.043). To confirm the robustness of our results, we con-
duct additional regressions using a probit model8 where the dependent variable pjgt
is a binary outcome which equals 1 if the group g in period t provides at least j
unit(s). We also control for the time trend and session fixed effects in the model. The
estimation results are shown in Table 1.5 . We find that the treatment MBP-AU sig-
nificantly increases the provision frequency of providing two units or more compared
to PYB while confirming the result that MPP-AU increases the provision frequency
of providing three units or more compared to PYB.
Result 2. The DU mechanisms tend to produce a larger probability of complete
non-provision compared to AU counterparts.
In terms of complete provision failures, we find that the two descending-unit auc-
tions performs notably worse than their ascending-unit counterparts, especially with
the marginal bid pricing rule (Fisher exact test, difference in the provision frequency
of 0 units: p < 0.001). The differences between AU and DU of providing 0 units are
not significant for the marginal pivotal pricing rule at the conventional significance
level (Fisher exact test, difference in the provision frequency of 0 units: p = 0.77).
This result suggests that the market clearing rule does make a difference in influenc-
ing the overall provision success. Even though the DU auction requires less stringent
conditions to achieve a higher provision rate (e.g., the DU auctions only require the
total contribution on the fourth unit to be higher than the cost to provide four units
while the AU auctions require the total offer of each unit from unit 1 to unit 4 to
7See Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) for a detailed discussion on the advantages of using Fisher’s
exact test with a limited sample size.
8A logistic regression yields similar results.
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be higher than the cost), our experimental results suggest the DU auctions perform
worse due to a higher possibility of complete provision failures.
Result 3. The increase of marginal value on each unit significantly boosts the pro-
vision success.
When it is optimal to provide 6 units, we find that the provision frequency of pro-
viding three or more units is much higher compared to the situation where providing
4 units are optimal (provision frequency of providing 3 or more units: PYB (20%)
compared with PYB-6 (60%), p < 0.001; MBP-AU (30%) compared with MBP-AU-6
(60%), p < 0.001, Fisher exact test.). However, since the value distribution is the
same on the inframarginal unit (the 3rd unit when providing 4 unit is optimal, and
the 5th unit when providing 6 units is optimal), we find there is a decrease in provision
success on the inframarginal unit when providing 6 units is optimal, though such a
decrease is not significant in PYB (provision frequency of providing the inframarginal
unit: PYB (20%) compared to PYB-6 (10%), p = 0.512; MBP-AU (30%) compared
with MBP-AU-6 (5%), p = 0.018).
Result 4. When providing 4 units is optimal, the PYB realizes the lowest social
surplus and consumer surplus in the last five periods; When providing 6 units is
optimal, MBP-AU-6 realizes a higher social surplus and consumer’s surplus compared
to PYB-6.
In Table 1.5 , we summarize the maximum social surplus, realized social surplus
and producers’ net revenue by treatment and we present results separately for all 10
periods, the first 5 periods and the last 5 periods. Since the group size varies across
sessions, the numbers are scaled to a group-size of five: for example, if realized social
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surplus is 120 for a group size of six, then the adjusted realized social surplus is 120×
5/6 = 100. The parenthesized percentages in the realized social surplus column are
the efficiency levels, which equal the realized social surplus divided by the maximum
social surplus; the parenthesized percentages in the consumers’ surplus column are
the share of consumers’ surplus, which equals the consumers’ surplus divided by the
realized social surplus; the parenthesized percentages in the producers’ net revenue
column are the share of producers’ net revenue, which equals the producers’ net
revenue divided by the realized social surplus.
From Table 1.5 , we observe that the overall efficiency level ranges from 58% to
72% (when providing 4 units are optimal), with the MBP-AU being the highest and
MBP-DU being the lowest in 10 periods. Comparing the efficiency result from the
first 5 periods with the results from the last 5 periods, we find that the PYB sees
the largest decrease in the overall efficiency (in terms of percentage, social surplus
decreases from 67% in the first 5 periods to 53% in the last 5 periods), while MPP-
DU sees a moderate increase in the efficiency level (increasing from 61% in the first
5 periods to 67% in the last 5 periods); other mechanisms all experienced a slight
decrease in the overall efficiency level. Generally, the DU auctions either experienced
a small decrease (MBP-DU, −2%) or a small increase (MPP-DU 6%) from the first 5
to the last 5 periods. In contrast, the magnitude of efficiency decrease is higher in the
AU mechanisms (PYB: −14%; MBP-AU: −6%; MPP-AU: −8%). When providing
6 units is optimal, we find the the PYB-6 also has a slightly larger decrease in the
efficiency level compared to MBP-AU-6 from the first 5 periods to the last 5 periods
(PYB, −16%; MBP-AU, −12%); again, the overall efficiency level is higher for MBP-
AU-6 compared to PYB-6.
In terms of the allocation of realized social surplus, Figure 1.3 presents the differ-
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ence of surplus allocation among different provision mechanisms. Figure 1.4 presents
the difference of surplus allocation for PYB and MBP-AU after the optimal provision
unit is changed from 4 to 6. In the last five periods, the realized social surplus is
ranked by
MBP-AU>MPP-DU>MPP-AU>MBP-DU>PYB;
the consumers’ surplus is ranked by
MPP-DU>MPP-AU>MBP-AU>MBP-DU>PYB;
the producers’ net revenue is ranked by
MBP-AU>MBP-DU>PYB>0>MPP-AU>MPP-DU.
The producers’ net revenue is negative in MPP-AU and MPP-DU because the pivotal
pricing will almost surely result a deficit for the producer and the transfer of surplus
to consumers makes the consumer’s surplus unsurprisingly exceed 100%. We also find
that when providing 6 units is optimal, MBP-AU-6 achieves a higher social surplus
and consumer’s surplus, but a lower producers’ net revenue compared to PYB-6. Two
sample t-tests are conducted to test whether the above differences are significant. De-
tailed test results are presented below each figure. Note that the MBP-AU achieves
almost a one third (31%) net increase in the realized social surplus compared to PYB
with 4 units being optimal while such an increase is about 12% with 6 units being
optimal. One may think that 12% is a notable reduction compared to a 31% increase;
however, this result is merely an artifact of the huge increase in total available social
surplus when the optimally provided unit changes from 4 to 6. The average increases
are very close in magnitude in these two situations. The increases in average social
surplus are 26 when providing 4 units is optimal and 24.5 when providing 6 units is
optimal, which equal to 52% and 49% of the surplus available from the social marginal
unit, respectively.
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Result 5. Compared to a counterfactual scenario where ”subjects” are assumed to
contribute randomly between 0 and their induced values, in the lab experiments,
PYB and AU auctions realize a higher percentage of the potential social surplus, DU
auctions realize a lower percentage of the potential social surplus compared to the
counterfactual scenarios. PYB and MBP rules realize a higher share of consumer
surplus while MPP rules realize a lower share of consumer surplus compared to the
counterfactual scenarios.
The purpose of the counterfactual simulation is to construct a benchmark where
human contributors are replaced with a computer program wherein each ”subject”
contributes randomly between zero and their induced values. The allocative effi-
ciencies generated from the counterfactual benchmarks are then compared to the
experiment outcomes (Gode and Sunder, 1993, 1997). The simulation results are
summarized in the squared brackets in the Table 1.5 . We find that PYB and two
AU auctions perform better than the counterfactual benchmarks where subjects just
contribute randomly with the induced value constraint. The increase of realized so-
cial surplus ranges from 7% (PYB) to 19% (MBP-AU) with 4 units optimal and
from 0% (PYB-6) to 5% (MBP-AU) with 6 units optimal. Interestingly, the two DU
mechanisms perform worse than the counterfactual benchmark. The loss in efficiency
ranges from −5% (MPP-DU) to −9% (MBP-DU). We also find that subjects are
able to collectively acquire a larger share of realized social surplus under PYB and
MBP mechanisms through strategic interactions, while subjects acquire a significantly
lower share of realized social surplus under the MPP mechanisms compared to the
counterfactual benchmarks.
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1.5.2 Individual Contribution Results
Result 6. The average marginal bid is significantly higher in MBP-AU compared to
PYB on the the first and second unit; such differences become insignificant as the
unit number increases.
Table 1.7 and Table 1.8 report the average marginal bid on each unit across
different treatments for the first 5 and the last 5 periods, respectively. Figure 1.3
presents the change of average marginal bid of MBP-AU compared to PYB from the
first 5 periods to the last 5 periods separately on unit 1 to unit 6. From Figure 1.3 , we
find that in the first 5 periods, the average marginal contribution is significantly higher
in the MBP-AU(or the MBP-AU-6) compared to PYB (or the PYB-6) on the first and
the second unit; such differences are mostly statistically significant according to the
Mann-Whitney U test (Unit 1: 4 unit optimal, p = 0.082, z = 1.736, 6 unit optimal,
p < 0.001, z = 5.284; unit 2: 4 unit optimal, p = 0.715, z = 0.364, 6 unit optimal, p =
0.0157, z = 2.417.). In the last 5 periods, the difference between PYB and MBP-AU
decreases, however, such difference is still statistically significant. (Mann-Whitney U
test Unit 1: 4 unit optimal, p < 0.001, z = 4.182, 6 unit optimal, p < 0.001, z = 6.351;
unit 2: 4 unit optimal, p = 0.048, z = 1.970, 6 unit optimal, p < 0.001, z = 4.318.)
The differences between MBP-AU(MBP-AU-6) and PYB (PYB-6) are not significant
on the remaining units except on the 6th unit, MBP-AU is significant higher than
PYB, despite their small difference in absolute value. Our results suggest that the
main advantage of MBP-AU is to reduce very inefficient provision outcomes (e.g.,
providing 0 units or only 1 unit) by attracting more contributions on the first two
units compared to PYB.
Result 7. The DU auctions have a larger proportion of near-zero bids on the first
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two units.
We report the number of near-zero bids, which is defined as bids smaller than or
equal to 1 experimental dollar, in Table 1.7 . We find that in the DU auctions, there
is a larger proportion of near-zero bids compared to the AU counterparts on the first
two units (Fisher exact test: Unit 1, MBP rule, p < 0.001, MPP rule, p < 0.001;
Unit 2, MBP rule, p < 0.0038, MPP rule, p = 0.6301). The DU mechanisms are
not as effective as AU mechanisms in raising revenue on the first several units due
to near-zero contributions, which leads to the overall differences in the realized social
surplus. Contributions lower than or equal to $1 suggest either the non-participation
decisions or (strategic) free-riding behaviors, which prevent the DU auctions from
achieving a high provision success by losing contributions on the first two units in
which the group holds relative high values.
Result 8. Individuals strategically lower the contribution on the inframarginal units
to lower the marginal cost on the provided unit under the MPP rules.
We find that under the MBP rules, there is a high percentage of near-zero con-
tributions on the unit 2, and a sudden decrease of near-zero contributions on unit 3
(Table 1.7 , Table 1.8 ). In the first 5 periods, the percentage near-zero contributions
decreases from 15.45% to 0.48% for MPP-AU and decreases from 22.41% to 7.69%
for MPP-DU. In the last 5 periods, the percentage of near-zero contributions decrease
from 22.73% to 4.55% for MPP-AU and decrease from 17.69% to 4.62% for MPP-DU.
Such decreasing trends are not observed for the MBP counterparts where the change
of percentage for the near-zero contributions are 2.50%, 2.31% respectively in the
first 5 periods and 2.08%, -0.77% respectively in the last 5 periods. This result is
consistent with the evidence that the average marginal bids on unit 2 and unit 3 are
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almost the same. Differences in group composition cannot explain the observed pat-
tern: according to our experimental design (Table 1.2 ), the same groups of subjects
went through both MB-AU (or MB-DU) and MP-AU (or MP-DU). Our counterbal-
ance design also mitigates the concerns for order effects. This result suggests subjects
strategically respond to the pivotal pricing rule when applied to a multiple units con-
text. Recall in equation(1.11), the marginal cost of providing an additional unit j
depends on whether one’s bid is pivotal or not on unit j − 1 and unit j. Table 1.9
summarizes the counts of individual contributions pivotal on unit j − 1 and unit j if
j units were provided. From Table 1.9 , we observe that if three units were provided,
one’s marginal cost of providing the third unit is likely to be determined by equation
1.11(d). Thus, when the group contribution on the second unit (
∑
b2i ) is similar to
the group contribution on the third unit (
∑
b3i ), each individual is more likely to face
a smaller marginal cost of providing the third unit. In this sense, we infer individuals
act collectively to reduce the group contribution on the second unit (but still higher
than provision cost) such that each individual has an incentive to contribute more to
support the third unit. Otherwise, if individual bids are relative high on the second
unit and no one is pivotal if two units are provided, the individual provision cost is
zero for providing two units. However, the cost will increase substantially for some
individuals when three units are provided.
To assess the treatment effect quantitatively, we run several regression models
comparing different provision mechanisms with the baseline PYB. The regression
results enable us to uncover several interesting results hidden by summary statistics
and nonparametric tests. We use a random effects model to account for individual-
specific effects.
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Result 9. Compared to the PYB, MBP-AU encourages a higher value revelation ratio
on the first three units but the bids decrease faster from unit 1 to unit 4 compared
to the decreasing trend in PYB.
From the marginal contribution incentives analysis, we notice that one’s contri-
bution decision on a unit can be dependent on the decision for the previous unit. For
example, the bid amount on the first unit may influence the contribution incentive on
the second unit. Thus, we include a unit-lagged term in the regression model, except
for the first unit. For the first unit, the regression model is:
b1it = β1v
1
i +
∑
k
β2kv
1
i ∗ IPAk + β5Period+ β6Cons+ ui + it; (1.12)
for the other units, the regression model is
bjit = β1v
j
i+
∑
k
β2kv
j
i ∗ IPAk+β3bj−1it +
∑
k
β4kb
j−1
it ∗ IPAk+β5Period+β6Cons+ui+it;
(1.13)
where the dependent variable bjit is individual i’s bid on unit j in period t. The v
j
i
represents individual i’s induced value on unit j, while IPAk is a dummy variable that
differentiates each individualized price mechanism with PYB treated as the baseline;
Period captures the time trend. The term ui is the individual-specific random effect
across different periods; the term it is individual-period specific error. Table 1.10
reports the regression results. The odd numbered models include individual’s induced
value, and a unit-lagged bid (bj−1), while the even numbered models include additional
terms of these two variables interacted with different IPA mechanisms. Compared
to the PYB baseline, we find that the MBP-AU encourages a higher value revelation
ratio, which implies a higher contribution on the first three units. The MBP-DU
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and MPP-DU only significantly increases contribution on the inframarginal or the
marginal unit (unit 3 for DU-MPP, and unit 4 for DU-MBP); the AU-MPP increases
the contribution on the third unit, however it decreases contributions on the second
and fourth unit.
Negative significant coefficients are observed for the unit-lagged interaction terms
on the first 4 units, while on the last two units, the interaction terms are generally
positive, some of them are significant. Since the main effect of the unit-lagged term
is positive, it indicates that compared to the PYB, in the IPA mechanisms, the bids
decrease faster from unit 1 to unit 4. One notable result from the regression table
is the low R2 observed for the first unit, where the induced value ranges from [20, 24]
while the provision cost is constant at 8N with N representing the group size. The
equilibrium strategy in this setting for a single unit threshold public good is the equal
cost sharing strategy (Borgers et al., 2015). Each individual will share the provision
cost and contribute equally. Though our experimental setting is very different from a
single unit threshold public good provision, this insight may explain why the induced
value is a poor predictor on contribution of the first or the second unit. We find the
induced value coefficient β1 only becomes positively significant starting from the third
unit.
1.6 Conclusion
Our experiments explore several novel provision approaches to provide multiple units
of public good in discrete increments. Our results suggest significant differences be-
tween these provision mechanisms in terms of provision success and value revelation.
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Most strikingly, we find significant improvement in social efficiency for individualized
price auction approaches. Our research brings new provision mechanisms into the
multiple units public good provision and we expect more studies on the multiple unit
public good provision problem, since a successful mechanism can be crucial in raising
private donations to establish a functional (e.g., environmental) market that can pro-
vide public goods (e.g., ecosystem services) in a decentralized way. We also expect
crowdfunding industry will benefit from innovative auction mechanisms to support
various projects through public contributions, such as using the IPA rule to support
a larger project with a higher success probability.
The individualized price auctions correspond to Lindahl (1919) framework where
each individual shares the cost that is determined by the intersection of marginal cost
and marginal social benefit and their private value being included in the social benefit.
We find that such approaches can improve efficiency relative to a straightforward pay-
your-bid approach in a multiple units public good context. We experimentally explore
several variants of the Lindahl-inspired auction approaches. Such auction approaches
may help increase private contributions to support multiple units or levels of a public
project, and help individuals reach out to the optimal provision with a lower average
unit price.
In the PYB mechanism, it is obvious individuals do not have the incentive to re-
veal their full values; their contributions would influence their actual cost. According
to Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) and Bagnoli et al. (1992), any contributions adding
up to the cost with no individual’s contribution exceeding his valuation is an equi-
librium, while in a successively undominated strictly perfect equilibrium (SUSPE),
the equilibrium “core” will be implemented. However, as pointed out in Bagnoli et
al. (1992) , “...The problem of obtaining the efficient outcome is much more diffi-
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cult and implementing the core requires a very strong refinement notion...the use of
such a strong refinement immediately raises the questions of its behavioral realism.”
Thus, we expect the experimental outcome of PYB mechanism to be suboptimal.
Though our proposed IPA mechanisms still fall short of reaching 100% efficiency, ex-
perimental results show substantial efficiency gains are achieved through various IPA
mechanisms.
Note that different from Bagnoli et al. (1992), where contributions are solicited
sequentially,9 we solicit multiple contributions from an individual at the same time.
Our approach enables us to obtain individual contribution behaviors for the units that
are outside the optimal provision set. Future research in this area can be fruitful.
Theoretically, new mechanisms are required to address the problem of the inefficient
equilibrium in multiple units of public goods provision. Equally important, empirical
work is needed on how to encourage both participation and contribution in real fund
raising activities using a transparent and easily understandable mechanism to realize
most of the potential social surplus.
9 Bagnoli et al. (1992) start soliciting the bids on the first unit only, and they calculate the
outcome. Depending on the provision outcome of the first unit, they will decide whether or not
to continue asking and evaluating bids on the second unit, and so on. In our approach, we ask
individuals to make a contribution on each unit at the same time, although the auctioneer still
evaluate aggregated bids sequentially.
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Table 1.1: Numerical Example
Unit Contributor 1 Contributor 2 Contributor 3 Cost
1 v11 = 24, b
1
1 = 18 v
1
2 = 20, b
1
2 = 18 v
1
3 = 19, b
1
3 = 18 30
2 v21 = 18, b
2
1 = 9 v
2
2 = 19, b
2
2 = 18 v
2
3 = 13, b
2
3 = 11 30
3 v31 = 16, b
3
1 = 8 v
3
2 = 14, b
3
2 = 13 v
3
3 = 10, b
3
3 = 10 30
4 v41 = 14, b
4
1 = 5 v
4
2 = 10, b
4
2 = 10 v
4
3 = 8, b
4
3 = 7 30
5 v51 = 8, b
5
1 = 4 v
5
2 = 4, b
5
2 = 13 v
5
3 = 6, b
5
3 = 4 30
6 v61 = 4, b
6
1 = 2 v
6
2 = 3, b
6
2 = 0 v
6
3 = 3, b
6
3 = 2 30
Note: In the example, there are six units available in total and three contributors. The vji denotes
individuals i’s induced value on unit j; the bji denote individuals i’s bid on unit j. There are three
contributors and the cost is 30 for each unit.
37
T
a
b
l
e
1
.2
:
E
x
p
er
im
en
t
S
eq
u
en
ce
S
es
si
on
T
re
at
m
en
t
1
T
re
at
m
en
t
2
G
ro
u
p
S
iz
e
T
ot
al
U
n
it
S
o
ci
al
ly
O
p
ti
m
al
U
n
it
C
os
t
×N
o.
of
G
ro
u
p
s
A
va
il
ab
le
U
n
it
1
P
Y
B
M
B
P
-A
U
7×
2
6
4
56
2
M
B
P
-A
U
P
Y
B
6×
2
6
4
48
3
M
B
P
-A
U
M
P
P
-A
U
5×
2
6
4
40
4
M
P
P
-A
U
M
B
P
-A
U
6×
2
6
4
48
5
M
B
P
-D
U
M
P
P
-D
U
7×
2
6
4
56
6
M
P
P
-D
U
M
B
P
-D
U
6×
2
6
4
48
7
P
Y
B
-6
M
B
P
-A
U
-6
6×
2
6
6
48
8
M
B
P
-A
U
-6
P
Y
B
-6
6×
2
6
6
48
N
ot
e:
S
es
si
on
s
1
to
6
te
st
d
iff
er
en
t
p
ro
v
is
io
n
m
ec
h
a
n
is
m
s,
w
it
h
tw
o
a
d
d
it
io
n
a
l
se
ss
io
n
s
fo
cu
se
d
o
n
th
e
eff
ec
t
fr
o
m
ch
a
n
g
in
g
th
e
o
p
ti
m
a
l
u
n
it
s.
T
h
e
gr
ou
p
si
ze
is
fr
om
5
to
7.
In
ea
ch
se
ss
io
n
,
su
b
je
ct
s
w
er
e
ra
n
d
o
m
ly
a
ss
ig
n
ed
to
o
n
e
o
f
tw
o
g
ro
u
p
s
a
n
d
w
er
e
a
sk
ed
to
m
a
ke
d
ec
is
io
n
s
in
tw
o
tr
ea
tm
en
ts
.
A
p
ar
ti
ci
p
an
t’
s
g
ro
u
p
m
em
b
er
sh
ip
re
m
a
in
ed
u
n
ch
a
n
g
ed
fo
r
o
n
e
tr
ea
tm
en
t.
T
h
er
e
w
er
e
1
0
d
ec
is
io
n
p
er
io
d
s
in
ea
ch
tr
ea
tm
en
t.
38
T
a
b
l
e
1
.3
:
S
u
m
m
ar
iz
e
S
ta
ti
st
ic
s
a
t
th
e
G
ro
u
p
L
ev
el
:
P
er
ce
n
ta
ge
of
D
ec
is
io
n
P
er
io
d
s
w
it
h
th
e
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
U
n
it
s
(f
ro
m
0
u
n
it
s
to
6
u
n
it
s)
P
ro
v
id
ed
P
ro
v
id
ed
0
U
n
it
s
1
U
n
it
2
U
n
it
3
U
n
it
4
U
n
it
5
U
n
it
6
U
n
it
O
b
s.
(e
ac
h
tr
ea
t.
)
B
as
el
in
e
P
Y
B
10
%
42
.5
%
27
.5
%
20
%
0%
0%
0%
40
A
sc
en
di
n
g-
U
n
it
A
u
ct
io
n
M
B
P
-A
U
3.
75
%
21
.2
5%
45
%
30
%
0%
0%
0%
80
M
P
P
-A
U
15
%
20
%
17
.5
%
45
%
2.
5%
0%
0%
40
D
es
ce
n
di
n
g-
U
n
it
A
u
ct
io
n
M
B
P
-D
U
25
%
20
%
27
.5
%
27
.5
%
0%
0%
0%
40
M
P
P
-D
U
20
%
15
%
32
.5
%
27
.5
%
5%
0%
0%
40
6
U
n
it
s
ar
e
O
pt
im
al
P
Y
B
-6
5%
20
%
15
%
22
.5
%
27
.5
%
10
%
0%
40
M
B
P
-A
U
-6
5%
10
%
12
.5
%
32
.5
%
35
%
5%
0%
40
39
T
a
b
l
e
1
.4
:
S
u
m
m
a
ri
ze
S
ta
ti
st
ic
s
at
th
e
G
ro
u
p
L
ev
el
:
P
er
ce
n
ta
ge
of
D
ec
is
io
n
P
er
io
d
s
w
it
h
A
t
L
ea
st
th
e
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
U
n
it
s
(f
ro
m
0
u
n
it
s
to
6
u
n
it
s)
P
ro
v
id
ed
P
ro
v
id
ed
≥1
U
n
it
≥2
U
n
it
s
≥3
U
n
it
s
≥4
U
n
it
s
≥5
U
n
it
s
≥6
U
n
it
s
O
b
s.
(e
ac
h
tr
ea
t.
)
B
as
el
in
e
P
Y
B
90
%
47
.5
%
20
%
0%
0%
0%
40
A
sc
en
di
n
g-
U
n
it
A
u
ct
io
n
M
B
P
-A
U
96
.2
5%
75
%
30
%
0%
0%
0%
80
M
P
P
-A
U
85
%
65
%
45
%
2.
5%
0%
0%
40
D
es
ce
n
di
n
g-
U
n
it
A
u
ct
io
n
M
B
P
-D
U
75
%
55
%
27
.5
%
0%
0%
0%
40
M
P
P
-D
U
80
%
65
%
32
.5
%
5%
0%
0%
40
6
U
n
it
s
ar
e
O
pt
im
al
P
Y
B
-6
95
%
75
%
60
%
37
.5
%
10
%
0%
40
M
B
P
-A
U
-6
95
%
85
%
72
.5
%
40
%
5%
0%
40
40
Table 1.5: The Influence of Treatment on Provision Probability
(1) (2) (3)
≥ 1 Unit ≥ 2 Units ≥ 3 Units
Treatment
MBP-AU 0.516 0.753∗∗ 0.324
(0.380) (0.252) (0.271)
MPP-AU -0.249 0.461 0.784∗∗
(0.367) (0.288) (0.303)
MBP-DU -0.610 0.189 0.245
(0.350) (0.282) (0.311)
MPP-DU -0.448 0.456 0.382
(0.356) (0.286) (0.308)
Period -0.0349 -0.0530 -0.0304
(0.0376) (0.0296) (0.0299)
Cons. 1.304∗∗∗ 0.0758 -0.834∗∗
(0.363) (0.269) (0.287)
Session fixed effects YES YES YES
N 240 240 240
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 1.9: The Counts of Individual Contributions Pivotal on Unit j − 1 and Unit j if
Unit j can be Provided
Contri. on Unit j − 1 Not Pivotal Pivotal Not Pivotal Pivotal
Contri. on Unit j Not Pivotal Not Pivotal Pivotal Pivotal
Unit 1 453 N.A. N.A. 287
Unit 2 177 4 276 283
Unit 3 78 40 103 559
Unit 4 2 0 116 622
Unit 5 0 0 2 738
Unit 6 0 0 0 740
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Figure 1.2: Average Individual Contribution for PYB and MBP-AU: First 5 Periods to
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Figure 1.3: Experiemntal Results on the Surplus and Surplus Allocation in the Last 5
Periods by Provision Mechanisms
158	 159	 159	 158	 158	
84	
110	
100.5	
90.5	
105.5	
75	
96	
133.5	
79	
142	
9	
14.5	
-32.5	
11.5	
-36.5	
PYB	 MBP-AU	 MPP-AU	 MBP-DU	 MPP-DU	
Max	Social	Surplus	 Realized	Social	Surplus	 Consumers'	Surplus	 Producers'	Net	Revenue	
31%	
28%	
61%	
8%	
5%	
26%	
89%	
505%	
20%	
78%	
28%	
461%	
Note: Mann-Whitney U test are conducted for each IPA with the baseline PYB rule in terms
of realized social surplus, consumers’ surplus and producers’ net revenue. We find that the real-
ized social surplus between PYB/MBP-AU is significant at the 0.05 level (p = 0.011, z = 2.552),
PYB/MPP-AU is significant at the 0.05 level (p = 0.025, z = 2.239). The consumers’ surplus
between PYB/MBP-AU is significant at the 0.01 level (p = 0.0032, z = 2.951), PYB/MPP-AU
is significant at 0.01 level (p < 0.001, z = 4.248), PYB/MPP-DU is significant at the 0.01 level
(p < 0.001, z = 3.740). The producers’ net revenue between PYB/MPP-AU is significant at the 0.01
level (p < 0.001, z = −7.516), PYB/MPP-DU is significant at the 0.01 level (p < 0.001, z = 7.482).
The omitted comparisons are not significant at 0.1 level.
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Figure 1.4: Experiemntal Results on the Surplus and Surplus Allocation in the Last 5
Periods with a Change of Optimal Unit
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Note: Mann-Whitney U test are conducted between the PYB-6 and MBP-AU-6. We find that
the realized social surplus between PYB-6/MBP-AU-6 is marginally insignificant at the 0.1 level
(p = 0.109, z = 1.599); the consumers’ surplus between PYB-6/MBP-AU-6 is significant at 0.1 level
(p = 0.0815, z = 1.742). The producers’ net revenue between PYB-6/MBP-AU-6 is significant at
0.05 level (p = 0.024, z = 2.252). The percentage values and arrows reflect the relative increase or
decrease of surplus compared to PYB-6 for the MBP-AU-6 mechanism.
Chapter 2
The Influence of Credit Stacking
Programs: The Coexistence of
Regional and Global
Environmental Markets
2.1 Introduction
Environmental and ecosystem service markets represent a frontier for science, policy,
and management. These markets may establish financial incentives for production
or create demand for environmental credits or off-sets as firms find necessary under
regulations regarding mitigation of negative environmental impacts (Alston et al.,
2013; Claassen et al., 2008). As environmental markets are incomplete or imperfect,
this frontier creates an ambiguity that motivates calls to constrain the functioning of
environmental markets.
A particular form for constraint concerns is what may be called ”credit stacking”
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or ”double dipping” (Cooley and Olander, 2011; Fox, 2008). In environmental or
ecosystem service markets, credit stacking generally refers to a situation where the
providers of ecosystem service credits are allowed to sell different types of credits
in separate markets, even if these credits are produced from a single management
practice, likely on a single parcel of land. With credit stacking permitted, credit
productions may overlap spatially for different services. This credit stacking issue
partially arises from the jointness in the production, or the “production complemen-
tarity” when the landowners could provide environmental benefits from the same
management process (Wossink and Swinton, 2007).
Horan et al. (2004) look at the the influence of the double dipping policy on the
overall social efficiency, depending on how the agri-environmental policy is targeted.
In their context, double dipping refers to a situation in which farmers can be paid
multiple times by different programs (coordinated or not) for the same environmental
improvement, which may be efficient if aggregate marginal payments equal marginal
production cost. Woodward (2011) offers a carefully-structured theoretical and quan-
titative simulation evaluation relating to the economic implications of credit stacking
policies. In Woodward’s model, a landowner’s technology involves a complementarity
and a specialization parameter in a joint production function for multiple types of
environmental credits. Woodward frames credits stacking as a multiple market (MM)
institution allowing the producers to sell jointly produced credits of all types, while
framing not allowing credit stacking as a single market (SM) institution, meaning the
producers of jointly produced (spatially overlapping) credits must choose one type to
sell in the market. Gonzlez-Ramrez and Kling (2015) extend Woodward’s model and
consider the influence of credit stacking policies in alternative second-best scenarios,
focusing on the efficiency loss of uncoordinated policies in different environmental
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markets. Valcu et al. (2013) and Yeo et al. (2012) are also relevant to our study as
they look at the environmental benefits for both carbon sequestration and water qual-
ity improvement through the same agricultural management process. Their studies
are empirically based and different from ours in significant ways. Particularly, dif-
ferent from previous studies, we consider the possible impacts of landowners’ market
participation choices under the SM restriction and analyze how landowners’ incentives
to participate in different markets affect production of environmental improvements
and social efficiency outcomes.
In this research, we focus on the implications when a regional environmental credit
is traded under the cap-and-trade framework while the price for a global environmen-
tal credit is fixed. Policy implications of similar hybrid market institutions have not
been well considered except several recent studies (Ambec and Coria, 2013; Caplan,
2006; Stranlund et al., 2015; Stranlund, 2015), though none of them has studied the
influence of policy instrument choices in relation to the market participation incen-
tives in a multiple environmental markets context. Given the prominent importance of
carbon sequestration and water quality improvement benefits, environmental market
participants may potentially face tradeoffs among multiple environmental markets
and consider which or both markets they should participate in and then optimize
production accordingly. Montero (2001) considers a permit system that can accom-
modate multiple pollutants under regulations. In our paper, we provide results when
a cap instrument is used to incentivize landowners in the presence of a competitive
environmental credit market to provide different types of environmental credits.
We use the water quality credit and carbon sequestration credit as illustrative
examples, recognizing when a global market exists for the carbon credit, a single
credit producer usually has no influence on the market price. At the same time,
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if a regional water quality credit trading market is established by a local regulator,
the carbon price and the market participation restrictions (e.g., not allowing credit
stacking) could significantly influence the supply and price dynamics in the water
quality credit market. We study landowners’ market choices in the SM, i.e., which
market they decide to participate in when there is a restriction on the number of credit
types they can sell for a single project. We also evaluate landowners’s profitability
in the MM and further evaluate social efficiency implications of the credit stacking
policy when a regulatory cap is set for a regional credit market.
Regarding multiple environmental benefits from the same agricultural or environ-
mental management process, previous studies have focused heavily on the co-benefits
from carbon credit market. The consequences of environmental co-benefits in the car-
bon trading markets have been well studied (Caparro´s et al., 2010; Feng and Kling,
2005; Feng et al., 2007; Glenk and Colombo, 2011). The credit stacking possibility
raises new opportunities to incorporate co-benefits into environmental markets. For
example, landowners could have the opportunity to sell all these environmental co-
benefits in separate environmental markets so that the landowners would receive rev-
enues from participating in these markets simultaneously, even though the co-benefits
are the outcome of the same management practice. Allowing credit stacking, then,
would be analogous to sales of jointly produced private goods. A case study on the
carbon sequestration co-benefits shows that incoporating co-benefits could improve
environment outcomes and increase revenue for farmers in the Upper Mississippi River
Basin (Feng et al., 2007), and considering co-benefits may also change the outcome
of cost-benefit tests in various soil carbon sequestration (Glenk and Colombo, 2011).
The co-benefits associated with the production of a primary environmental credit
have been recognized in other markets as well, such as in the water quality credit
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market (Lentz et al., 2014). Liu and Swallow (2016) conduct real water quality credit
transactions based on preferences for co-benefits revealed by experiment subjects,
and illustrate a way to incorporate public values for environmental co-benefits, as
well as water quality improvement, in the Ohio river basin water quality trading
market. Their results show that incorporating co-benefits in the water quality trading
market could potentially lead to a substantial welfare improvement. In this study,
we reconsider the co-benefits questions by theoretically analyzing the overall welfare
implications while recognizing the differences in their respective impacts between
the carbon and water quality credits and the possibility of un-bundling the primary
benefit and the co-benefits from various conservation practices, including agricultural
best management practices adopted by farmers to influence the natural production
functions.
Existing studies on the credit stacking problem were framed as profit maximization
problems where polluters abate several complementary pollutants (Woodward, 2011;
Gonzlez-Ramrez and Kling, 2015). However, the credit stacking issue originates from
the landowners’ eligibility and potential profits from simultaneously participating
in multiple environmental markets by supplying environmental credits (Cooley and
Olander, 2011; Fox, 2008; Valcu et al., 2013). Landonwers could generally provide
more cost effective abatement and trade such abatements as environmental credits to
regulated industrial polluters when stacking is allowed. For example, the passage of
the 1972 and 1977 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments (Clean Water
Act, or CWA) do not create any new permitting requirement and preserve agricul-
tural exemptions from permitting, including normal farming practices. Therefore,
unregulated landowners could produce water quality credits by improving normal
management practices and receive compensations from trading water quality abate-
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ment credits to polluters (Horan et al., 1999), who usually face a higher marginal
abatement cost compared landowners. For simplicity, we assume a well defined water
quality credit in this paper.1 The differences in marginal abatement cost between
landowners and industry polluters provides ample opportunities for water quality
credit trading in local areas. The industrial polluters could purchase water quality
credits from low-cost abatement entities such as agricultural producers. Also, the
polluters usually have to abate a certain amount of water pollution to satisfy the
regulatory cap collectively, and thus establish a more or less fixed demand for water
quality credits, as long as the credit price is below their marginal abatement cost.
Thus, in our context, we assume the water quality regulation drives the demand for
the water quality credits and the industrial polluters would purchase credits from
low abatement cost providers. It is possible that the polluters could meet the re-
quired abatement entirely through trading. Otherwise, the polluters have to satisfy
the regulatory cap through their own, more expensive abatement actions.
Water quality trading markets are often coordinated on a regional level (Fisher-
Vanden and Olmstead, 2013).2 The National Resource Conservation Service has
been encouraging participation by non-point sources in the water quality market
through its Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP),3 though with a low
participation rate national wide. Our results imply that allowing credit stacking could
1Practically, the same unit of water quality credit could have different social value depending the
geographical location. The trading ratio approach or potential cost sharing between point-nonpoint
trading could further complicate the problem (Horan and Shortle, 2005, 2011; Caplan, 2013). Our
paper ignores such practical complications and focuses on the implications of credit stacking policies.
2For example, currently active water quality credit trading markets include the Ohio River Basin
Trading Project, the Pennsylvania Nutrient Credit Trading, the Chesapeake Bay Watershed Nutrient
Credit Exchange, the Red Cedar River Nutrient Trading Pilot (Shortle, 2013). Not all of these
regional markets necessarily involve the participations of regulated buyers; some of the markets rely
on voluntary offsets and conservation incentivized buyers not under regulatory pressure.
3See http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/main/national/programs/financial/eqip/.
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potentially strengthen local water quality trading markets, where credit producers
receive increased revenues and profits from selling co-produced environmental credits
in other environmental market. Since the greenhouse emission is largely a global
issue, in our model, we assume the landowners benefit from participating in a carbon
market with a fixed carbon credit price (Weitzman, 2014). This paper does not
address question of the relative advantages of a quantity or a price instrument as
a market regulatory choice (Ambec and Coria, 2013; Weitzman, 1974; Pizer, 2002;
Goulder and Schein, 2013). However, our paper does provide valuable insights into
landowners’ participation incentives and revenue potentials when they face different
policy instruments in environmental markets, with and without the possibility of
credit stacking.
Our results show that in the SM institution (where the credit stacking is not al-
lowed), depending on the carbon credit market price (relative to the regulatory trad-
ing cap for the water quality credit), several different market participation scenarios
might emerge where the landowners with cost advantage in water quality improve-
ment or carbon sequestration choose to participant in different markets. We find
when the water quality credit cap is fixed and the carbon credit price exceeds a cer-
tain price threshold, the differences between the SM and MM institutions disappear
as both types choose to sell in the carbon market and the water quality trading cap
fails to influence the landowners’ participation and production decisions. We further
consider the regulator’s choice on the water quality trading cap in the regional en-
vironment market, assuming the regulator may or may not fully recognize positive
“leakage” from the carbon sequestration benefit (Paltsev, 2001; Baylis et al., 2014) or
the policy spillover effect (Ambec and Coria, 2015). Our results indicate that ignoring
the carbon sequestration benefit can lead to a substantial loss in the realized social
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net benefit. Also, we show that even if the regulator ignores the carbon sequestration
benefit, allowing credit stacking by compensating all produced credits still increases
net social benefits.
2.2 Model
In this section, we present a general model where multiple types of credits are pro-
duced simultaneously by landowners. We assume the carbon credit price is exogenous
and a landowner is a price taker in the carbon credit market. A landowner’s market
participation and production decisions will not affect the carbon credit price. The
market price for water quality credit can be influenced by the trading cap Aˆ, which is
set exogenously by a regulator who is primarily concerned about the water quality at
a local or regional level. Local polluters, who are subject to effluent regulation, are
required to purchase water quality credits (“permits”) in order to pollute beyond a
certain level. Thus, the polluters are the buyers in the water quality trading market.
As a result, the equilibrium price of the water quality credit is determined under a
competitive cap-and-trade framework. We assume that for the polluters, buying the
water quality credits in the trading market is always cheaper than abating pollution
themselves.4 Since the carbon credit is a global environmental good, here we simply
assume a competitive market and ignorable the influence of any single supplier.
Landowners are the main providers of environmental credits which could be used
4In other words, we assume the polluters would purchase the water quality credits if the credit
price is below a certain price level. Since one motivation of allowing water quality credit trading
between agricultural and industrial sectors is the potential cost saving opportunities from the agri-
cultural sector, we assume the cost of buying the traded credits is cheaper than the abatement cost
for the polluter. If the market credit price is higher than the abatement cost, the polluters may
choose to satisfy the cap entirely through pollution abatement and thus there is no need to establish
trading between agricultural and industrial sectors.
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to offset pollution. For simplicity, we consider a situation where there are two types
of landowners producing water quality and carbon credits. Each type of landowners
have the cost advantage in producing one of the relevant credit types. We call the
landowners who have a cost advantage in producing carbon credits type-c, carbon
landowners, and the ones with a cost advantage in producing water quality credits
type-w, water quality landowners. The market price for carbon credit is denoted by
pˆ, which is determined by the carbon price in a global market. The market price
for the water quality credit is denoted by pw, which is influenced by the trading cap
Aˆ and the supply of water quality credits in a regional environmental market. For
example, the water quality credit price pw is the lowest when both types of landowners
decide to participate in the water quality market due to a higher aggregated supply.
Therefore, the water quality credit price pw capture the influence of the aggregated
water quality credit supply at a regional level.
We specify a cost function that has been widely in the literature, which assumes
production complementarity by interacting the cost of these two credits in the cost
function (Woodward, 2011; Antoniou and Kyriakopoulou, 2015; Moslener and Re-
quate, 2007; Stranlund et al., 2015). The role of the regulator is to choose a cap Aˆ
in the water quality market such that the demand for water quality credits in the
market satisfies the overall water quality target, which may not correspond uniquely
to the cap since outcomes may be influenced by policy toward credit stacking. Let c
(or w) be the amount of carbon (or water quality) credit that a landowner chooses to
produce. We use gc (or gw) to denote the production cost of the carbon (or the water
quality) landowner. The regulator then sets the cap for water quality credit Aˆ accord-
ing to her best knowledge.5 The carbon credit price will then influence landowners’
5We will discuss the optimal cap choices under various circumstances in Section 2.3. We first
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participation and production decisions as it interacts with market dynamics and the
resulting price for water quality credits under either the SM or MM stacking policy.
2.2.1 Market Outcomes in SM
In the single market (SM) institution where the credit stacking is not allowed, landown-
ers can only choose to sell in one market. For simplicity, we assume that two credit
markets coexist with N homogenous landowners of each type. The cost functions for
the landowner specialized in carbon production (gc) and the landowner specialized in
water quality production (gw) are:
gc =
η
2
c2 +
1/η
2
w2 − γc ∗ w, (2.1)
and
gw =
1/η
2
c2 +
η
2
w2 − γc ∗ w (2.2)
where the specialization parameter η plays a role determining the type of producer,
while the complementarity parameter plays an identical role in the cost functions of
each type. We assume the complementarity level γ and the specialization level η are
both within (0, 1). The specialization level increases if the variable η decreases, and
the complementarity level increases if the γ increases (Woodward, 2011). Given the
water quality credit cap Aˆ and the market price of carbon pˆ, the problem faced by
assume the water quality credit cap Aˆ is fixed and the same in SM and MM.
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type-c landowner (who is specialized in the carbon abatement) is:6
max
jc
{
mc : max
c,w
pˆc−
(
η
2
c2 +
1/η
2
w2 − γc ∗ w
)
;mw : max
c,w
pww −
(
η
2
c2 +
1/η
2
w2 − γc ∗ w
)}
,
(2.3)
where jc ∈ (mc,mw) denotes a type-c landowner’s market participation choice of
either choosing the carbon market mc or the water quality market mw. If jc = mc,
the landowner chooses to participate in the carbon credit market and will only receive
revenue from producing carbon credits. Note that the landowner may still produce
some water quality credits due to production complementarity, but can not sell these
water quality credits due to the SM restriction. Interpretations on choosing the
water quality market (jc = mw) are similar. Note that the type-c landowner’s profit
from selling in the water quality market is influenced by the water quality credit
price, which is determined by the aggregated supply and the demand of water quality
credits. Similarly, the problem faced by the type-w landowner (who is specialized in
producing water quality credits) is:
max
jw
{
mc : max
c,w
pˆc−
(
1/η
2
c2 +
η
2
w2 − γc ∗ w
)
;mw : max
c,w
pww −
(
1/η
2
c2 +
η
2
w2 − γc ∗ w
)}
,
(2.4)
where jw denotes a type-w landowners’ market choice to participate in the carbon
market, jw = mc or the water quality market, jw = mw.
We set up a model where both types of landowners make the market participation
decisions depending on the profit of joining a market. We identify several possible
6Our model assumes N homogenous landowners of each type (located within the boundary of
a regional water quality trading market) and thus each landowner still faces a competitive market
price in the water quality market with a trading cap Aˆ, similar to the competitive price assumption
implied in Woodward (2011) by assuming a representative producer. Thus, each landowner (either
the type-c or the type-w) has little or no influence on the market price pw through the change of
production. However, the presence of market power in the water quality market (perhaps less likely
in carbon market) could potentially complicate our analyses (Hahn, 1984; Liski and Montero, 2006)
and is left outside the scope of this analysis.
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scenarios: [1] both types choose to sell in the carbon market (Jc = mc, Jw = mc); [2]
both types choose to sell in the water quality carbon market (Jc = mw, Jw = mw); [3]
all type-c landowners sell credits in the carbon market while the type-w landowners
sell credits in the water quality market (Jc = mc, Jw = mw), [4] all type-c landowners
sell credits in the water quality market while the type-w landowners sell credits in
the carbon market (Jc = mw, Jw = mc), [5] only a percentage τ1 of type-c landowners
sell credits in the water quality market while all type-w, water quality landowners
sell credits in the water quality market (Jc = τ1mw, Jw = mw), [6] only a percentage
τ2 of type-w landowners sell credits in the water quality market while the type-c
landowners sell credits in the carbon market (Jc = mc, Jw = τ2mc). The notation
Jc = mc represents the case where all type-c landowners choose to sell in the carbon
market; the notation Jc = τ1mc represents the case where only τ1N type-c landowners
choose to sell in carbon market and (1− τ1)N type-c landowners choose to sell in the
water quality markets. Other market participation choices Jc and Jw are interpreted
similarly. The range of the market price for carbon, pˆ, determines which of the above
six scenarios applies when multiple markets coexist. As noted before, the water
quality price pw is determined by aggregated supply and demand in the water quality
market.
Proposition 2.1. Define pˆ1 ≡ Aˆ(1−γ2)η2N(1+η2) , pˆ2 ≡ Aˆη
2(1−γ2)
N
, pˆ3 ≡ Aˆ(1−γ2)N and pˆ4 ≡
Aˆ(1 − γ2). If pˆ < pˆ1, Jc = mw, Jw = mw; if pˆ ∈ [pˆ1, pˆ2), Jm = τ1mw, Jw = mw; if
pˆ ∈ [pˆ2, pˆ3), Jc = mc, Jw = mw; if pˆ ∈ [pˆ3, pˆ4), Jc = mc, Jw = (1 − τ2)mc; if pˆ ≥ pˆ4,
Jc = mc, Jm = mc.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 2.1 identifies the ranges of carbon price, relative to an exogenous water
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quality credit cap, under which the market participation choices differ in the SM. Note
that each landowner has two options: selling in the carbon market only or the water
quality market only. Proposition 2.1 assumes that a landowner will always choose
to participate in the market that gives a higher profit. For example, the condition
where both types are selling in the water quality market is when a carbon landowner
cannot get a higher profit by switching to the carbon market and a water quality
landowner cannot get a higher profit by switching to the carbon market. We expect
this situation is only likely if the market price for carbon is relatively low, consistent
with predictions by Proposition 2.1. Similarly, we can derive the ranges of carbon
price where other market participation choices are possible. Detailed calculations can
be found in the Appendix.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the market participation choices for both types of landowners
as the carbon credit price increases in the SM. When pˆ < pˆ1, the market price for
carbon is below a threshold price pˆ1, both types of landowners sell in the water
quality market. As the market price for carbon increases and passes pˆ1, a carbon
landowner may get a higher profit by selling in the carbon market than by selling in
the water quality credit market. Therefore, carbon landowners will start to move out
of the water quality market until the carbon credit price reaches pˆ2, where all carbon
landowners move out of the water quality credit market and sell in the carbon market.
In this situation, both types of landowners will choose to sell in the market for which
they enjoy a cost advantage until the price increases to pˆ3. When the carbon credit
price passes pˆ3, water quality farmers start to move out of the water quality market
in pursuit of a higher profit from selling carbon credits and when the carbon credit
price increases further to pˆ4, both types of landowners will choose to sell in the carbon
market.
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2.2.2 Market Outcomes in MM
In the multiple market (MM) institution where the credit stacking is allowed, landown-
ers could produce and sell in both markets. Still, assume the two credit markets
coexist and there are N landowners of each type, the cost functions for the type-c
landowner gc and the type-w landowner gw are:
gc =
η
2
c2 +
1/η
2
w2 − γc ∗ w
and
gw =
1/η
2
c2 +
η
2
w2 − γc ∗ w.
Given the water quality credit cap Aˆ and the carbon credit market price pˆ, the
problem faced by a type-c landowner is:
max
c,w
pˆc+ pww − (η
2
c2 +
1/η
2
w2 − γc ∗ w). (2.5)
The problem faced by a type-w landowner is:
max
c,w
pˆc+ pww − (1/η
2
c2 +
η
2
w2 − γc ∗ w). (2.6)
For any price pˆ and pw, the optimal supply function for the type-c landowner is:
cMMc =
pˆ
η
+ pwγ
1− γ2 , w
MM
c =
ηpw + γpˆ
1− γ2 . (2.7)
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The optimal supply function for the type-w landowner:
cMMw =
ηpˆ+ γpw
1− γ2 , w
MM
w =
pw
η
+ γpˆ
1− γ2 . (2.8)
The water quality credit price pw is determined by the market clearing condi-
tion where the aggregate supply intersects with the demand (the trading cap or the
abatement target Aˆ) in the water quality market,
pw =
Aˆ(1− γ2)− 2Nγpˆ
N(η + 1
η
)
. (2.9)
Note that when pˆ ≥ Aˆ(1−γ2)
2Nγ
, the above equation indicates an unrealistic water quality
price below zero, suggesting that when the carbon price is high enough, the landowners
will produce enough water quality credits freely and exceed the regulatory cap Aˆ. In
this situation, since the demand is fixed at the cap, we assume the water quality price
falls to zero and
pw = max
(
Aˆ(1− γ2)− 2Nγpˆ
N(η + 1
η
)
, 0
)
. (2.10)
The price of water quality credit could gradually fall close to zero when a high carbon
price induces an over supply of water quality credits through complementarity in
production.
After deriving the optimal supply function for each type of landowner, we substi-
tute equations (2.7) and (2.8) into the profit functions (2.5) and (2.6), respectively
for each type of landowner. Therefore, the type-c landonwer’s profit is:
piMMc =
1
2η
pˆ2 + γpˆpw +
η
2
p2w
1− γ2 . (2.11)
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The profit of the type-w landowner is:
piMMw =
η
2
pˆ2 + γpˆpw +
1
2η
p2w
1− γ2 . (2.12)
where pw is specified according to equation (2.10).
2.2.3 Equilibrium Prices and Quantities
In our model, the price for the carbon credit is treated as an exogenous variable set by
the carbon trading in the global market. The water quality credit price is influenced
by the trading cap and the aggregate water quality credit supply in both SM and
MM institutions, but the SM incentivizes landowners to focus on one credit type. As
a result, the equilibrium water quality price in the SM can be quite different from the
price in the MM.
Proposition 2.2. Given the same cap Aˆ and the carbon credit price pˆ, the water
quality credit price in the MM (pMMw ) is no higher than the water quality credit price
in the SM (pSMw ), i.e., p
MM
w < p
SM
w . Also, the water quality credit price p
MM
w decreases
as the carbon credit price pˆ increases in the MM.
Proof. In the MM institution, according to equation (2.10), the water quality credit
price is
pMMw = max
(
Aˆ(1− γ2)− 2Nγpˆ
N(η + 1
η
)
, 0
)
= max
(
pw(mw,mw)− 2γpˆη
1 + η2
, 0
)
. (2.13)
which is lower than pw(mw,mw) =
Aˆ(1−γ2)η
(1+η2)N
, the water quality credit price in the SM
when both carbon and water quality landowners choose to sell in the water quality
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market when the carbon credit price is below a certain threshold. Take the first order
derivatives of pMMw (pˆ) with respect to pˆ, we can conclude that:
∂pMMw (pˆ)
∂pˆ
=
 −
2γη
1+η2
if pˆ < p˜
0 if pˆ ≥ p˜
. (2.14)
where p˜ = Aˆ(1−γ
2)
2Nγ
, above which the equilibrium water quality credit price falls to zero
as Aˆ is satisfied due to production complementarity. The above inequality also implies
that the water quality credit price will weakly decrease as the carbon price increase in
the MM institution. Therefore, the water quality credit price in the MM is no higher
than the water quality credit price in the SM, thus we conclude pMMw ≤ pSMw .
The above results show that MM institution may enable more cost effective abate-
ment approach for polluters who need to purchase water quality credits to satisfy
the targeted level of abatement. Another interesting result is that the carbon price
and the water quality price move in opposite directions. An increase in the carbon
price will bring down the equilibrium water quality credit price, because landowners’
participations in the global carbon market effectively subsidize water quality credit
production more at a higher carbon credit price. In the MM institution, according
to the supply function (2.7) and (2.8), the total water quality credits produced is
QMMw = Nw
MM
c +Nw
MM
w = max
(
Aˆ,
2Nγpˆ
1− γ2
)
(2.15)
while the total carbon credits produced are
QMMc = pˆN
1 + η2
η(1− γ2) +max
(
2γ(Aˆ− 2pˆNγ
1− γ2 )
η
1 + η2
, 0
)
, (2.16)
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The following proposition shows the interconnections between the total carbon
credits produced QMMc and the water quality trading cap Aˆ.
Proposition 2.3. The total carbon credit produced increases with the carbon price pˆ
and the water quality credit cap Aˆ, i.e., ∂Q
MM
c
∂Aˆ
> 0 and ∂Q
MM
c
∂pˆ
> 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
Since ∂Q
MM
c
∂Aˆ
> 0 and ∂Q
MM
c
∂pˆ
> 0, either an increase in the carbon price or an
increase in the water quality credit cap will lead to more carbon credits in the MM
institution. In the SM institution, depending the range of carbon price, the total water
quality credits and the carbon credits depend on the landowners’ market participation
choices.
Proposition 2.4. When the carbon credit price is pˆ and the water quality credit cap
is Aˆ, the total carbon credits QSMc ≤ QMMc at any pˆ and Aˆ, and the total water quality
credits QSMw ≥ QMMc .
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 2.4 shows that in the SM, when the water quality credit cap is set
at Aˆ, the production complementarity may enable a higher total water quality credit
production exceeding the trading cap Aˆ, when the two types choose to sell in different
markets. The amount of positive leakage equals the production of water quality
credits “unintentionally” produced by the landowners choose to sell in the carbon
market. We also find that the total carbon credit produced in SM is always lower
than the carbon credit produced in MM, in contrast to a higher water quality credits
produced from the SM. When the carbon credit price increases beyond a threshold
price p˜ = Aˆ(1−γ)
2Nγ
, the SM and MM institutions lead to identical carbon and water
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quality credits productions. In this situation, water quality credits produced in both
the SM and MM will exceed the cap Aˆ. Note that the above results hold when the
carbon credit price pˆ and the water quality credit cap Aˆ are the same in SM and MM.
2.3 The Social Welfare Implications of Alternative
Credit Stacking Policies
In the carbon market, we assume that the market equilibrium price pˆ is always fixed
and thus a single landowner has no influence on the market price either through
market participation decisions or change of production. Depending on the market
price for the carbon credit, the SM and MM stacking policies could lead to different
welfare implications. We assume the regulator can choose different water quality
credit caps in the SM and MM institutions.
2.3.1 The First-Best Benchmark
In the first-best world, the optimal supplies (c∗i , w
∗
i ) and (c
∗
k, w
∗
k) maximize the fol-
lowing social net benefit function
NB = Bc (
∑
i ci +
∑
k ck) +Bw (
∑
iwi +
∑
k wk)−
(∑N
i=1 gci(ci, wi) +
∑N
k=1 gwk(ck, wk)
)
,
(2.17)
where the Bc(·) and Bw(·) are the benefit functions for carbon credit and water
quality improvement, respectively, with B′t(·) > 0 and B′′t (·) ≤ 0 where t = c, w.
The subscript i indexes the carbon landowners and the subscript k indexes the water
quality landowners, thus, gci(·) is the cost function for carbon landowner i and gwk(·)
is the cost function for water quality landowner k. For simplicity, we assume a
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constant marginal carbon sequestration benefit dc at the market price pˆ and a constant
water quality improvement benefit dw. Therefore, the first order conditions imply
pˆ = dc =
∂gci
∂ci
= ∂gwk
∂ck
and dw =
∂gci
∂wi
= ∂gwk
∂wk
.
2.3.2 Maximize Carbon Sequestration and Water Quality Ben-
efits
In our context, we first assume the water quality credit cap is chosen so that the
benefits from carbon sequestration and water quality pollution abatement are maxi-
mized. The regulator’s cap choice is denoted as Ar. Therefore, the regulator chooses
Ar to maximize the total net social benefit function,
NB(Ar) = Bc (Qc(Ar)) +Bw (Qw(Ar))
−
(∑N
i=1 gci(ci(Ar), wi(Ar)) +
∑N
k=1 gwk(ck(Ar), wk(Ar))
)
,
(2.18)
where the total carbon credits produced Qc(Ar) =
∑N
i=1 ci(Ar) +
∑N
k=1 ck(Ar) and
the water quality credits produced Qw(Ar) =
∑N
i=1wi(Ar) +
∑N
k=1 wk(Ar). Note that
the above benefit function could also written
NB(Ar) = pˆQc(Ar) +Bw (Qw(Ar))
−
(∑N
i=1 gci(ci(Ar), wi(Ar)) +
∑N
k=1 gwk(ck(Ar), wk(Ar))
)
,
(2.19)
which is the profit maximization problem where a benevolent regulator cares about
the landonwers’ total revenue from carbon credits and the benefit from the local water
quality improvement, even though the regulator may not care about environmental
benefit of carbon sequestration locally or globally.
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Based on the first order condition, an optimal cap Ar = A
∗ is chosen when
B′c (Qc(Ar))Q′c(Ar) +B′w (Qw(Ar))Q′w(Ar)
=
∑N
i=1
(
∂gci
∂ci
∂ci(Ar)
∂Ar
+ ∂gci∂wi
∂wi(Ar)
∂Ar
)
+
∑N
k=1
(
∂gwk
∂ck
∂ck(Ar)
∂Ar
+ ∂gwk∂wk
∂wk(Ar)
∂Ar
)
.
(2.20)
Substitute the credit production Qc(Ar) =
∑N
i=1 ci(Ar) +
∑N
k=1 ck(Ar) and Qw(Ar) =∑N
i=1 wi(Ar) +
∑N
k=1wk(Ar), we can also get,∑N
i=1
(
(pˆ− ∂gci∂ci )
∂ci(Ar)
∂Ar
+ (dw − ∂gci∂wi )
∂wi(Ar)
∂Ar
)
+
∑N
k=1
(
(pˆ− ∂gwk∂ck )
∂ck(Ar)
∂Ar
+ (dw − ∂gwk∂wk )
∂wk(Ar)
∂Ar
)
= 0.
(2.21)
In the MM, for each landowner i (type-c) or k (type-w), according to the profit max-
imization behavior, we have pˆ = ∂gci
∂ci
= ∂gwk
∂ck
and pw(Ar) =
∂gci
∂wi
= ∂gwk
∂wk
. Therefore, the
MM leads to a first-best outcome if pMMw = dw. In the SM with market participation
constraints, for a landowner i (k), either pˆ = ∂gci
∂ci
(pˆ = ∂gwk
∂ck
) or dw =
∂gci
∂wi
(dw =
∂gwk
∂wk
)
holds. Therefore, the SM is a restriction that can prevent the society from achieving
a first-best outcome, which can be obtained from the unconstrained maximization in
the MM if pMMw (Ar) = dw. Below we derive the optimal cap choice Ar in MM as well
as in SM when market choices are restricted and show the pMMw (Ar) = dw in the MM
when the regulator cares about both carbon and water quality benefit.
Proposition 2.5. If the regulator considers both carbon and water quality benefit
when choosing the cap Ar, the optimal cap choice in the MM is
AMMr =
dw(η +
1
η
) + 2γpˆ
1− γ2 N, (2.22)
and the water quality credit price equals the marginal benefit of water quality improve-
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ment, pMMw = dw. The optimal cap choices in the SM are
ASMr =

dw(η+
1
η
)+2γpˆ
1−γ2 N if pˆ <
dwη
2−γ(
(N+η2)dw
(1−γ2)(2−γ)η ,
N(1+η2)dw
(1−γ2)(2−γ)η
)
if pˆ = dwη
2−γ
dw
1
η
+γpˆ
1−γ2 N if pˆ ∈ ( dwη2−γ , dwη2η2−γ )(
dwη
(2η2−γ)(1−γ2) ,
Ndwη
(2η2−γ)(1−γ2)
)
if pˆ = dwη
2η2−γ
dwη
(2η2−γ)(1−γ2) if pˆ >
dwη
2η2−γ
, (2.23)
the water quality credit price equals the marginal benefit of water quality improvement
plus the marginal influence of cap choice on the benefit of carbon , pSMw = dw +
pˆQ′c(Ar).
According to Proposition 2.5, the equilibrium water quality price in the MM
pMMw = dw. Therefore, MM leads to a first-best best outcome when the regulator can
choose a cap to maximize both carbon and water quality benefit.
Proposition 2.6. When the regulator cares both carbon sequestration and water qual-
ity improvement benefit and choose the regulatory cap optimally, the realized net social
benefit in MM NBMM is always higher than or equal to NBSM , the realized net social
benefit in SM.
Proof. See Appendix.
2.3.3 Maximize Water Quality Benefits
Alternatively, we assume a local regulator cares only about the benefits from water
quality pollution abatement. Thus, we assume a second-best condition where the cap
is chosen so that the benefits from water quality pollution abatement are maximized.
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The regulator’s cap choice is denoted as Ar′ . Therefore, the regulator chooses Ar′
that maximizes the net social benefit function,
NB(Ar′) = dw (Qw(Ar′))−
(∑N
i=1 gci(ci(Ar′), wi(Ar′)) +
∑N
k=1 gwk(ck(Ar′), wk(Ar′))
)
,
(2.24)
where the water quality improvement producedQw(Ar′) =
∑N
i=1wi(Ar′)+
∑N
k=1wk(Ar′),
the Bw(·) is the benefit function for water quality improvement. Based on the first
order condition, an optimal cap Ar′ is chosen when
B′w (Qw(Ar′))Q
′
w(Ar′)
=
∑N
i=1
(
∂gci
∂ci
∂ci(Ar′ )
∂Ar′
+ ∂gci
∂wi
∂wi(Ar′ )
∂Ar′
)
+
∑N
k=1
(
∂gwk
∂ck
∂ck(Ar′ )
∂Ar′
+ ∂gwk
∂wk
∂wk(Ar′ )
∂Ar′
)
.
(2.25)
The second-best condition is achieved if the Ar′ is chosen such that the above
equation (2.25) holds, or
∑N
i=1
(
(0− ∂gci∂ci )
∂ci(Ar)
∂Ar
+ (dw − ∂gci∂wi )
∂wi(Ar)
∂Ar
)
+
∑N
k=1
(
(0− ∂gwk∂ck )
∂ck(Ar)
∂Ar
+ (dw − ∂gwk∂wk )
∂wk(Ar)
∂Ar
)
= 0.
(2.26)
Compared to the equation (2.21), even the MM could not achieve the first-best out-
come since the cap chosen from maximizing equation (2.24) could not satisfy the
equation (2.21). Both MM and SM lead to second-best outcomes when the regulator
cares only about the water quality benefit.
Proposition 2.7. If the regulator only considers water quality benefits when choosing
the cap choice Ar, the “second-best” cap choice in the MM is
AMMr′ =
dw(η +
1
η
)
1− γ2 N, (2.27)
which is smaller than the optimal cap choice AMMr . The water quality credit price
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equals the marginal benefit of water quality improvement minus the marginal influence
of cap choice on the carbon benefit, pMMw = dw − pˆQ′c(Ar′).
The “second-best” cap choices in the SM are
ASMr =

dw(η+
1
η
)
1−γ2 N if pˆ < dwη(
(N+η2)dw
(1−γ2)η ,
N(1+η2)dw
(1−γ2)η
)
if pˆ = dwη
dw
1
η
1−γ2N if pˆ ∈ (dwη, dwη )(
dw
(1−γ2)η ,
Ndw
(1−γ2)η
)
if pˆ = dw
η
dw
(1−γ2)η if pˆ >
dw
η
, (2.28)
and the water quality credit price equals the marginal benefit of water quality improve-
ment, pSMw = dw.
Figure 2.2 shows the optimal water quality credit cap choices under various cir-
cumstances. We conclude that all other thing being equal, the optimal caps are always
higher when the regulator considers both carbon sequestration and water quality im-
provement benefits or when credit stacking is allowed.
Proposition 2.8. When the regulator only considers water quality benefit when choos-
ing the cap choice Ar′, the MM leads to a higher social net benefit compared to SM
except when pˆ ≥ max(dw(1+η2)
2ηγ
, dw
η
), the MM leads to the same net social benefit com-
pared to SM.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 2.8 shows even if the regulator ignores the carbon sequestration benefit
in choosing the water quality credit cap, the MM still leads to a strictly higher net
social benefit in most cases. However, if the carbon credit price (the marginal benefit
74
of carbon abatement) pˆ ≥ max(dw(1+η2)
2ηγ
, dw
η
), the MM will lead to a same net social
benefit. Figure 2.3 shows that the overall net social benefit as the carbon credit
price changes in different scenarios. Not surprisingly, the loss in the social net benefit
is increasing with the carbon credit price when the regulator ignores the carbon
sequestration benefits. Also, when the regulator ignores the carbon sequestration
benefit, the MM performs weakly better than SM.
2.4 Conclusions and Discussion
Our research shows how the restrictions on market participation choices (e.g., the lim-
itation imposed by the SM institution on the number of markets to participate) can
lead to significantly different market outcomes where multiple environmental markets
co-exist. According to our specification, allowing credit stacking (the MM institution)
leads to a higher social surplus when the water quality credits are sold to polluters
facing a regulatory cap (and high abatement costs at the source) and the carbon
credit price is exogenous when the regulator considers both carbon sequestration and
water quality improvement benefit in choosing the cap. We show that the regulator
forgoes a substantial amount of net social benefit if the carbon sequestration benefit
is ignored. Also, our research demonstrates how the cap choice for one credit and
the market price of another credit can jointly influence landowners’ market partici-
pation and production choices, assuming price taking behaviors. These relationships
are important for designing a comprehensive, inter-connected environmental market
where multiple types of environmental credits are traded at the same time. Currently,
many environmental markets focus on the provision of only one type of credit and may
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lead to over-provision of certain types of credit if the regulator fails to consider the
complementarity in the natural production process. Such over-provision potentially
decreases the production of other goods or benefit, including perhaps more valuable
environmental benefits.
To establish functional environmental markets with multiple types of credits can
be particularly challenging. If the cap-and-trade framework is applied to some mar-
kets, an inappropriate choice on the cap will lead to distortions in other environmen-
tal markets. Furthermore, the complementarity that exists in production could even
magnify the efficiency loss from an incorrectly chosen cap compared to a baseline
where environmental markets are assumed to be isolated from one another. Also,
the process of of establishing multiple markets many require significant efforts from
policy makers and may face may legislation challenges. One particular challenge may
come from polluters. The establishment of multiple credit markets requires specific
regulations on these credits, and such regulations will likely increase the abatement
or transaction cost of producers. However, when credit producers are allowed to sell
all types of credits, the per unit cost of a credit is likely to decrease, such as a lower
water quality price in the MM shown in this study. Thus, from the perspective of
the polluters, the overall compliance cost may actually decrease, or from the perspec-
tive of the society, such lower net costs may push the balance of marginal costs and
benefits toward a higher environmental quality.
We assume a specific functional form for the credit producers’ cost functions. This
functional form captures two important technology parameters: the specialization
level, which reflects the heterogeneity among different types of credit producers; the
complementarity level, which reflects the ability to produce other credits “for free”
when maximizing profit for one type of credit. However, we expect our results hold
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for more generalized functional forms with production complementarity.
In order to calculate the optimal cap choices, we make simplifying assumptions
regarding the regulator’s information, and assume the regulator could choose the
trading cap correctly with the benefit information such as Bc(·) and Bw(·) available.
Depending on the pre-existing distortions in different second-best scenarios (Fullerton
and Metcalf, 2001; Holland, 2009; Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956), the SM might perform
better than MM policy (Gonzlez-Ramrez and Kling, 2015; Woodward, 2011). The
problem of designing a functional environmental credit trading system is of crucial
interest to environmental economists. Current discussions and debates surrounding
the credit stacking policy only reflect one aspect of potential challenges. A full under-
standing of the credit trading system needs more theoretical research on the choice
of an optimal institution, which can be region specific or a mixed combination of cur-
rent trading institutions, such as a hybrid design incorporating SM and MM designs
in the presence of market distortions. On the other hand, practical considerations
such as how to encourage landowners’ participations, how to incentivize landown-
ers beside monetary compensations and how to impose appropriate regulations on
polluters and enforce compliance standards are also important to encourage partici-
pations and transactions in environmental markets. More research in the above areas
could be helpful to improve the trading rules and enhance the efficiency for multiple
environmental markets.
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Figure 2.1: Market Participation Choices in SM.
Note: This figure shows the market participation choices depending on the carbon credit price pˆ.
The solid rectangles represent the carbon landowners; the dotted rectangles represent the water
quality landowners. The size of the rectangles reflects the percentage of carbon or water quality
landowners’ choices to participate in the carbon market (mc) or the water quality market (mw).
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Figure 2.2: Water Quality Credit Cap Choice in MM and SM.
Note: This figure shows the regulator’s water quality credit cap choice in MM and SM. Case 1
shows the situation where the regulator cares about both the carbon sequestration and water quality
improvement benefits.Case w shows the situation where the regulator cares only about the water
quality improvement benefits.
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Figure 2.3: Social Net Benefit in MM and SM.
Note: This figure shows the realized social net benefit in MM and SM. Case 1 shows the situation
where the regulator cares about both the carbon sequestration and water quality improvement bene-
fits. Case 2 shows the situation where the regulator cares only about the water quality improvement
benefits.
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Appendix
Proof for Proposition 2.1 We solve the landowners’ market participation
choices in the SM assuming that a landowner will always choose the market that
returns a higher profit.
Expected Profit Conditional on the market participation choices, a type-c
landowner chooses production (cSMc , w
SM
c ) to maximize profit. If jc = mc, a type-
c landowner chooses to participate in the carbon market and the corresponding profit
function is:
max
cSMc ,w
SM
c
pˆc− (η
2
c2 +
1/η
2
w2 − γc ∗ w). (2.29)
As a result, the optimal production can be expressed as:
cSMc (mc) =
pˆ
(1− γ2)η , w
SM
c (mc) =
γpˆ
1− γ2 . (2.30)
If jc = mw, then a type-c landowner’s profit function is:
max
cSMc ,w
SM
c
pww − (η
2
c2 +
1/η
2
w2 − γc ∗ w) (2.31)
In this case, the optimal supply functions are
cSMc (mw) =
γpw
1− γ2 , w
SM
c (mw) =
pwη
1− γ2 (2.32)
if the carbon landowners sell in the water quality market in the single market insti-
tution.
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Similarly, conditional on the market participation choice jc or jw, a type-w landowner
chooses production (cSMw , w
SM
w ) to maximize profit. If jw = mc, then a type-w
landowner’s optimal supply functions are:
cSMw (mc) =
pˆη
1− γ2 , w
SM
w (mc) =
γpˆ
1− γ2 . (2.33)
If jw = mw, then a type-w landowner’s supply functions are:
cSMw (mw) =
γpw
1− γ2 , w
SM
w (mw) =
pw
(1− γ2)η , (2.34)
Denote the profit of the carbon landowner selling in the carbon market as pic(mc),
the profit of the carbon landowner selling in the water quality market is denoted as
pic(mw). Similarly, denote the profit of the water quality landowner by piw(mc) and
piw(mw), which depends on the market participation choice. Thus we have,
pic(mc) =
pˆ2
2(1− γ2)η , (2.35)
or
pic(mw) =
p2wη
2(1− γ2) . (2.36)
For a water quality landowner who sells in the water quality market, the profit is:
piw(mw) =
p2w
2(1− γ2)η , (2.37)
If a water quality landowner chooses to sell in the carbon market, the profit is:
piw(mc) =
pˆ2η
2(1− γ2) . (2.38)
83
Market Participation Choices Based on the conditional profits, all carbon
landowners participate in the carbon market (Jc = mc) if
pic(mc) > pic(mw)⇒ pˆ > pwη; (2.39)
all carbon landowners participate in the water quality market (Jc = mw) if
pic(mc) < pic(mw)⇒ pˆ < pwη; (2.40)
furthermore, τ1N (0 < τ1 < 1) carbon landowners participate in the water quality
market (Jc = τ1mw) if
pic(mc) = pic(mw)⇒ pˆ = pwη; (2.41)
Similarly, all water quality landowners participate in the carbon market (Jw = mc)
if
piw(mc) > piw(mw)⇒ pˆ > pw
η
; (2.42)
all water quality landowners participate in the water quality market (Jw = mw) if
piw(mc) < piw(mw)⇒ pˆ < pw
η
; (2.43)
furthermore, τ2N (0 < τ1 < 1) water quality landowners participate in the water
quality market (Jw = τ2mw) if
piw(mc) = pic(mw)⇒ pˆ = pw
η
; (2.44)
Since η ∈ (0, 1), pwη < pwη and when pˆ < pwη, both types of landowners will choose
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to participate in the water quality market. When pˆ > pw
η
, both types of landowners
will choose to participate in the carbon credit market. When pˆ ∈ [pwη, pwη ], some
landowners will participate in one market and some will participate in the other
market.
Water Quality Credit Price pw In the market equilibrium, the water quality
credit price pw is determined by the aggregated supply and the demand. Specifically,
when pˆ < pwη, both the type-w and type-c landowners are selling in the water quality
credit market, therefore, the market clearing condition is
NwSMc (mw) +Nw
SM
w (mw) = Aˆ, (2.45)
thus,
pw =
Aˆ(1− γ2)η
(1 + η2)N
. (2.46)
Therefore, when pˆ < Aˆ(1−γ
2)η2
(1+η2)N
, both types will choose to sell in the water quality
market.
As the carbon price pˆ increases, it is possible pˆ = pwη and some carbon landowners,
τ1N will choose to sell in the water quality market and (1− τ1)N will choose to sell
in the carbon market, the market clearing condition is
τ1Nw
SM
c (mw) +Nw
SM
w (mw) = Aˆ, (2.47)
thus,
pw =
Aˆ(1− γ2)η
(1 + τ1η2)N
. (2.48)
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Therefore, when pˆ ∈ [ Aˆ(1−γ2)η2
(1+η2)N
, Aˆ(1−γ
2)η2
N
), τ1N carbon landowners will choose to sell
in the water quality market and all water quality landowners will choose to sell in the
water quality market with τ1 =
Aˆ(1−γ2)
pˆN
− 1
η2
.
When the carbon price pˆ further increases and pˆ ∈ [ Aˆ(1−γ2)η2
N
, A(1−γ
2)
N
), all carbon
landowners will choose to sell in the carbon market and all water quality landowners
will choose to sell in the water quality market. In this situation, the market clearing
condition is,
NwSMw (mw) = Aˆ, (2.49)
and
pw =
Aˆ(1− γ2)η
N
. (2.50)
We can verify pic(mc) > pic(mw) and piw(mw) > piw(mc) when pˆ ∈ [ Aˆ(1−γ2)η2N , A(1−γ
2)
N
).
The upper bound A(1−γ
2)
N
is determined when water quality landowners start to sell
in the carbon market so that pˆ < pw
η
= Aˆ(1−γ
2)η
Nη
When the carbon price pˆ ∈ [A(1−γ2)
N
, Aˆ(1− γ2)), all carbon landowners will choose
to sell in the carbon market and some water quality landowners will choose to sell in
the water quality market. In this situation, the market clearing condition is,
τ2Nw
SM
w (mw) = Aˆ, (2.51)
and
pw =
Aˆ(1− γ2)η
τ2N
. (2.52)
In this situation, τ2N water quality landowners will choose to sell in the water quality
market and all carbon landowners will choose to sell in the carbon market with
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τ2 =
Aˆ(1−γ2)
pˆN
. When pˆ ≥ Aˆ(1− γ2), the last water quality landowner moves out of the
water quality market since pˆ ≥ pw
η
.
Define pˆ1 ≡ Aˆ(1−γ2)η2N(1+η2) , pˆ2 ≡ Aˆη
2(1−γ2)
N
, pˆ3 ≡ Aˆ(1−γ2)N and pˆ4 ≡ Aˆ(1−γ2). Since γ, η ∈
(0, 1), we can infer that pˆ1 < pˆ2 < pˆ3 < pˆ4. If pˆ ≤ pˆ1, then the market participation
choices are (mw,mw); if pˆ ∈ [pˆ1, pˆ2), the market participation choices are (τ1mw,mw),
where τ1 =
Aˆ(1−γ2)
pˆN
− 1
η2
; if pˆ ∈ [pˆ2, pˆ3), the market participation choices are (mc,mw); if
pˆ ∈ [pˆ3, pˆ4), the market participation choices are (mc, (1− τ2)mc), where τ2 = Aˆ(1−γ2)pˆN ;
if pˆ ≥ pˆ4, the equilibrium market participation choices are (mc,mc).
Proof for Proposition 2.3 The carbon credits produced in MM
QMMc = N
(
pˆ
η
+pwγ
1−γ2 +
ηpˆ+γpw
1−γ2
)
= N
(
pˆ( 1
η(1−γ2) +
η
1−γ2 ) + 2pw
γ
1−γ2
)
= N
(
pˆ( 1
η(1−γ2) +
η
1−γ2 )− 4pˆγ
2
(1−γ2)(η+ 1
η
)
+ 2Aˆγ
η+ 1
η
)
= N
(
pˆ 1+η
2
η(1−γ2) + 2γ(Aˆ− 2pˆγ1−γ2 ) η1+η2
)
(2.53)
since
pw =
Aˆ(1− γ2)− 2Nγpˆ
N(η + 1
η
)
according to equation (2.10) when pw > 0. Therefore, accounting the situation when
pˆ ≥ p˜ with p˜ = Aˆ(1−γ2)
2Nγ
, we can conclude that
QMMc = Npˆ
1 + η2
η(1− γ2) +N ∗max
(
2γ(Aˆ− 2pˆγ
1− γ2 )
η
1 + η2
, 0
)
, (2.54)
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Take the partial derivative of QMMc w.r.t. Aˆ, we have
∂QMMc
∂Aˆ
= N ∗max( 2γη
1 + η2
, 0) ≥ 0. (2.55)
Take the partial derivative of QMMc w.r.t. pˆ, we have
∂QMMc
∂pˆ
= N
(
1+η2
η(1−γ2) − 4γ
2
1−γ2
η
1+η2
)
= N
(
1
1−γ2 (
1+η2
η
− 4γ2 η
1+η2
)
)
> N
(
1
1−γ2 (
2η
η
− 4γ2 η
2η
)
)
= N
(
1
1−γ2 (2− 2γ2)
)
> 0
(2.56)
when pˆ < p˜. When p ≥ p˜, ∂QMMc
∂pˆ
= N 1+η
2
η(1−γ2) . Since γ ∈ (0, 1) and η ∈ (0, 1), we
conclude ∂Q
MM
c
∂Aˆ
≥ 0 and ∂QMMc
∂pˆ
≥ 0, with the equalities hold only when p ≥ p˜.
Proof for Proposition 2.4 To calculate the total credits produced in the SM
institution, we need to consider different market participation choices in relevant
carbon price ranges. According to Proposition 2.1, we can further infer that,
• pˆ ≤ pˆ1,7 the landowners’ participation choices are Jc = mw, Jw = mw, then
Qw(mw,mw) = Aˆ and Qc(mw,mw) = pw(mw,mw)
2Nγ
1−γ2 ;
• pˆ ∈ [pˆ1, pˆ2), the landowners’ participation choices are Jc = τ1mw, Jw = mw, then
Qw(τ1mw,mw) = Aˆ+
τ1Nγpˆ
1−γ2 and Qc(τ1mw,mw) = N ∗ (1−τ1)pˆ/η+(1+τ1)γpw(τ1mw,mw)1−γ2 ;
• pˆ ∈ [pˆ2, pˆ3), the landowners’ participation choices are Jc = mc, Jw = mw then
7The prices pˆ1, pˆ2, pˆ3 and pˆ4 are defined in Propostion 2.1
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Qw(mc,mw) = Aˆ+N ∗ γpˆ1−γ2 and Qc(mc,mw) = N ∗ pˆ/η+γpw(mc,mw)1−γ2 .
• pˆ ∈ [pˆ3, pˆ4), the landowners’ participation choices are Jc = mc, Jw = (1− τ2)mc,
which implies Qw(mc, (1−τ2)mc) = Aˆ+ Nγpˆ1−γ2 + (1−τ2)Nγpˆ1−γ2 and Qc(mc, (1−τ2)mc) =
N
1−γ2 (
pˆ
η
+ (1− τ2)pˆη + τ2γpw(mc, (1− τ2)mc));
• pˆ ≥ pˆ4, the landowners’ participation choices are Jc = mc, Jw = mc, Qw(mc,mc) =
pˆN 2γ
1−γ2 and Qc(mc,mc) = pˆN
1/η+η
1−γ2 ;
where pw(mc,mw) =
Aˆη(1−γ2)
N
, pw(mw,mw) =
Aˆη(1−γ2)
N(1+η2)
, pw(mw,mc) =
Aˆ(1−γ2)
Nη
,
pw(τ1mw,mw) =
Aˆ(1−γ2)
N(τ1η+
1
η
)
, and pw(mc, (1− τ2)mc) = Aˆη(1−γ2)τ2N .
Comparing the total water quality credits produced, we find QSMw ≥ QMMw = Aˆ if
pˆ < pˆ4. When pˆ ≥ pˆ4, the carbon price is so high that both types decide to sell in the
carbon market in the SM, QSMw = Q
MM
w > Aˆ if pˆ ≥ Aˆ(1−γ
2)
2Nγ
. In the SM, when both
types choose to sell in the carbon market (pˆ ≥ pˆ4), the total carbon credits produced
are the highest
Qc(mc,mc) = N ∗ pˆ/η + pˆη
1− γ2 = Npˆ
1 + η2
η(1− γ2) . (2.57)
The total carbon credit produced in the MM is:
QMMc = pˆN
1 + η2
η(1− γ2) +max
(
2γ(Aˆ− 2pˆNγ
1− γ2 )
η
1 + η2
, 0
)
, (2.58)
since the water quality price pw in the MM cannot fall below zero.
Therefore, QMMc ≥ QSMc .
Proof for Proposition 2.5
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Optimal Cap Choice in MM In the MM institution where credit stacking is
allowed, when pˆ < Ar(1−γ
2)
2Nγ
, Qw(Ar) = Ar; when pˆ ≥ Ar(1−γ2)2Nγ , Qw(Ar) = 2pˆNγ1−γ2 . Thus,
Q′w(Ar) = 0. Substitute the marginal benefit functions, the LHS of equation (2.20)
becomes,
B′c (Qc(Ar))Q
′
c(Ar) +B
′
w (Qw(Ar))Q
′
w(Ar) = dc
(
N∑
i=1
∂ci(Ar)
∂Ar
+
N∑
k=1
∂ck(Ar)
∂Ar
)
+ dw.
(2.59)
In the MM, since there is no restriction on the market participation choices, pˆ =
∂gci(·)
∂ci
= ∂gwk(·)
∂ck
and pw(Ar) =
∂gci(·)
∂wi
= ∂gwk(·)
∂wk
for any carbon landowner i and water
quality landowner k. Also, according to the supply functions (2.7) and (2.8) in MM,
we have, ∂ci(Ar)
∂Ar
= γ
N(η+ 1
η
)
, ∂wi(Ar)
∂Ar
= η
N(η+ 1
η
)
, ∂ck(Ar)
∂Ar
= γ
N(η+ 1
η
)
and ∂wk(Ar)
∂Ar
= 1
Nη(η+ 1
η
)
.
As a result, the RHS of equation (2.20) becomes,
N
(
∂gci
∂ci
∂ci(Ar)
∂Ar
+ ∂gci
∂wi
∂wi(Ar)
∂Ar
)
+N
(
∂gwk
∂ck
∂ck(Ar)
∂Ar
+ ∂gwk
∂wk
∂wk(Ar)
∂Ar
)
= 2pˆγ
η+ 1
η
+ pw(Ar).
(2.60)
Therefore,
2pˆγ
η + 1
η
+ dw =
2pˆγ
η + 1
η
+ pw(Ar), (2.61)
or
dw = pw(Ar). (2.62)
Therefore, in the MM, the marginal benefit of water quality improvement equals the
equilibrium price in the water quality market. The optimal cap choice in MM
AMMr =
dw(η +
1
η
) + 2γpˆ
1− γ2 N, (2.63)
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and the society achieves its first best outcome. The maximized social net benefit is
NBMMr =
1
2
(pˆ2 + d2w)(
1
η
+ η) + 2pˆdwγ
1− γ2 N (2.64)
Optimal Cap Choice in SM In the SM institution where credit stacking is
not allowed, landowners’ could only choose to participate and receive revenue from
one market. According to Propostion 2.1, depending on the carbon credit price pˆ,
landowners’ participation choices would differ. Therefore, for a given carbon price pˆ,
a regulator could choose a cap Ar so that different market participation choices might
emerge.
Specifically, when Ar ≥ (1+η2)pˆN(1−γ2)η2 , the equilibrium market participation choices are
(mw,mw). Thus, the LHS of equation (2.20) becomes,
B′c (Qc(Ar))Q
′
c(Ar) +B
′
w (Qw(Ar))Q
′
w(Ar) = dc
(
N∑
i=1
∂ci(Ar)
∂Ar
+
N∑
k=1
∂ck(Ar)
∂Ar
)
+ dw.
(2.65)
Due to the SM restriction, only pw(Ar) =
∂gci(·)
∂wi
= ∂gwk(·)
∂wk
holds for any carbon
landowner i and water quality landowner k. Also, according to the supply func-
tions in SM, we have, ∂ci(Ar)
∂Ar
= γ
N(η+ 1
η
)
, ∂wi(Ar)
∂Ar
= η
N(η+ 1
η
)
, ∂ck(Ar)
∂Ar
= γ
N(η+ 1
η
)
and
∂wk(Ar)
∂Ar
= 1
Nη(η+ 1
η
)
. As a result, the RHS of equation (2.20) becomes,
N
(
∂gci
∂ci
∂ci(Ar)
∂Ar
+ ∂gci
∂wi
∂wi(Ar)
∂Ar
)
+N
(
∂gwk
∂ck
∂ck(Ar)
∂Ar
+ ∂gwk
∂wk
∂wk(Ar)
∂Ar
)
= γ
η+ 1
η
(∂gci
∂ci
+ ∂gci
∂wi
) + pw(Ar)
= γ
η+ 1
η
(
ηγpw(Ar)
1−γ2 − γpw(Ar)η1−γ2 + γpw(Ar)η(1−γ2) − γpw(Ar)η(1−γ2)
)
+ pw(Ar)
= pw(Ar)
(2.66)
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Therefore,
2pˆγ
η + 1
η
+ dw = pw(Ar), (2.67)
or
dw = pw(Ar)− 2pˆγ
η + 1
η
. (2.68)
Substitute in the equilibrium market price pw(Ar) =
Ar(1−γ2)
N( 1
η
+η)
, we can find that the
optimal cap choice in SM when
Ar ≥ (1 + η
2)pˆN
(1− γ2)η2
is
ASMr =
dw(η +
1
η
) + 2γpˆ
1− γ2 N. (2.69)
When Ar ∈ [ pˆ(N+η2)(1−γ2)η2 , pˆN(1+η
2)
(1−γ2)η2 ), the equilibrium market participation choices are
(τ1mw,mw), which implies (1−τ1)N carbon landowners will choose the carbon market
while the others, τ1N carbon landowners and N water quality landowners, will choose
the water quality market. Due to the SM restriction, only pw(Ar) =
∂gci(·)
∂wi
= ∂gwk(·)
∂wk
hold for any carbon landowner i and water quality landowner k. Also, according to
the supply functions in SM, we have, ∂ci(Ar)
∂Ar
= γ
N(τ1η+
1
η
)
, ∂wi(Ar)
∂Ar
= η
N(τ1η+
1
η
)
, ∂ck(Ar)
∂Ar
=
γ
N(τ1η+
1
η
)
and ∂wk(Ar)
∂Ar
= 1
Nη(τ1η+
1
η
)
when a landowner chooses the water quality market
(j = mw), and
∂ci(Ar)
∂Ar
= ∂wi(Ar)
∂Ar
= ∂ck(Ar)
∂Ar
= ∂wk(Ar)
∂Ar
= 0 when a landowner chooses
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the carbon market (j = mc). As a result, the RHS of equation (2.20) becomes,
(1− τ1(Ar))N
(
∂gci
∂ci
∂ci(Ar)
∂Ar
+ ∂gci
∂wi
∂wi(Ar)
∂Ar
)
+ τ1(Ar)N
(
∂gci
∂ci
∂ci(Ar)
∂Ar
+ ∂gci
∂wi
∂wi(Ar)
∂Ar
)
+ (τ ′1(Ar)− τ ′1(Ar))Ngci(ci, wi) +
∑N
k=1
(
∂gwk
∂ck
∂ck(Ar)
∂Ar
+ ∂gwk
∂wk
∂wk(Ar)
∂Ar
)
= γ
η+ 1
η
(τ1
∂gci
∂ci
+ ∂gci
∂wi
) + pw(Ar)
= γ
η+ 1
η
(
τ1(
ηγpw(Ar)
1−γ2 − γpw(Ar)η1−γ2 ) + γpw(Ar)η(1−γ2) − γpw(Ar)η(1−γ2)
)
+ pw(Ar)
= pw(Ar) =
pˆ
η
(2.70)
Therefore,
pˆ(γ − 1)
η
+ dw = pw(Ar) =
pˆ
η
, (2.71)
or
dw = pˆ(
2
η
− γ
η
). (2.72)
When Ar ∈ [ Npˆ1−γ2 , pˆ(N+η
2)
(1−γ2)η2 ) and the equilibrium market participation choices are
(m∗c ,m
∗
w). Due to the SM restriction, only pw(Ar) =
∂gwk(·)
∂wk
and pˆ = ∂gci(·)
∂ci
hold for any
carbon landowner i and water quality landowner k. Also, according to the supply
functions in SM, we have, ∂ci(Ar)
∂Ar
= ∂wi(Ar)
∂Ar
= 0, ∂ck(Ar)
∂Ar
= γ
N(η+ 1
η
)
and ∂wk(Ar)
∂Ar
=
1
Nη(η+ 1
η
)
. As a result, the RHS of equation (2.20) becomes,
N
(
∂gci
∂ci
∂ci(Ar)
∂Ar
+ ∂gci
∂wi
∂wi(Ar)
∂Ar
)
+N
(
∂gwk
∂ck
∂ck(Ar)
∂Ar
+ ∂gwk
∂wk
∂wk(Ar)
∂Ar
)
= pw(Ar)
(2.73)
Therefore,
pˆγ
1
η
+ dw = pw(Ar), (2.74)
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or
dw = pw(Ar)− pˆγη. (2.75)
Substitute in the equilibrium market price pw(Ar) =
Ar(1−γ2)
N 1
η
, we can find that the
optimal cap choice in SM is
ASMr =
dw
1
η
+ γpˆ
1− γ2 N. (2.76)
When Ar ∈ [ pˆ1−γ2 , Npˆ1−γ2 ), the equilibrium market participation choices are (mc, (1−
τ2)mc), which means τ2N water quality landowners will choose the water quality
market while the others, including (1− τ2)N water quality landowners and N carbon
landowners, will choose the carbon market. Due to the SM restriction, only pw(Ar) =
∂gwk(·)
∂wk
holds for water quality landowner k choose to sell in the water quality market.
Also, according to the supply functions in SM, we have, ∂ck(Ar)
∂Ar
= γ
Nτ2
1
η
and ∂wk(Ar)
∂Ar
=
1
Nητ2
1
η
when a landowner chooses the water quality market (j = mw), and
∂ci(Ar)
∂Ar
=
∂wi(Ar)
∂Ar
= ∂ck(Ar)
∂Ar
= ∂wk(Ar)
∂Ar
= 0 when a landowner chooses the carbon market (j =
mc). As a result, the RHS of equation (2.20) becomes,
N
(
∂gci
∂ci
∂ci(Ar)
∂Ar
+ ∂gci
∂wi
∂wi(Ar)
∂Ar
)
+ τ2(Ar)N
(
∂gck
∂ck
∂ck(Ar)
∂Ar
+ ∂gck
∂wk
∂wk(Ar)
∂Ar
)
+ (1− τ2(Ar))N
(
∂gwk
∂ck
∂ck(Ar)
∂Ar
+ ∂gwk
∂wk
∂wk(Ar)
∂Ar
)
+N(τ ′2(Ar)− τ ′2(Ar))gwk(ck, wk)
= pw(Ar) = pˆη
(2.77)
Therefore,
(
γ
η
− η)pˆ+ dw = pw(Ar) = pˆη, (2.78)
or
dw = pˆ(2η − γ
η
). (2.79)
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When Ar <
pˆ
1−γ2 , the equilibrium market participation choices are (mc,mc), all
landowners will choose the carbon market. Since ∂ci(Ar)
∂Ar
= ∂wi(Ar)
∂Ar
= ∂ck(Ar)
∂Ar
=
∂wk(Ar)
∂Ar
= 0 when a landowner chooses the carbon market (j = mc). As a result,
the RHS of equation (2.20) becomes,
N
(
∂gci
∂ci
∂ci(Ar)
∂Ar
+ ∂gci
∂wi
∂wi(Ar)
∂Ar
)
+N
(
∂gck
∂ck
∂ck(Ar)
∂Ar
+ ∂gck
∂wk
∂wk(Ar)
∂Ar
)
= 0
(2.80)
and the LHS of equation (2.20) also equals 0. Therefore, the choice of the regulator
cap Ar does not matter as long as Ar <
pˆ
1−γ2 .
To summarize, when dw > pˆ(
2
η
−γ
η
), the regulator chooses the capAr =
dw(η+
1
η
)+2γpˆ
1−γ2 N ;
when dw = pˆ(
2
η
− γ
η
), the regulator could choose any cap Ar ∈
(
(N+η2)pˆ
(1−γ2)η2 ,
N(1+η2)pˆ
(1−γ2)η2
)
;
when dw ∈ (pˆ(2η − γη ), pˆ( 2η − γη )), the regulator chooses the cap Ar =
dw
1
η
+γpˆ
1−γ2 N ;
when dw = pˆ(2η − γη ), the regulator could choose any cap Ar ∈
(
pˆ
1−γ2 ,
Npˆ
1−γ2
)
; when
dw < pˆ(2η − γη ), the regulator could choose any cap Ar ≤ pˆ1−γ2 .8
Proof for Proposition 2.6 The Proposition 2.6 could come directly from the
“second-best” theory as the MM always achieve the social optimal outcome while the
restriction in SM could only lead a weakly smaller social net benefit. To see this,
when the social planner cares about both the carbon sequestration and water quality
benefit, the social net benefit in MM is
NBMMr =
1
2
(pˆ2 + d2w)(
1
η
+ η)
1− γ2 N +
2pˆdwγ
1− γ2N. (2.81)
8We are assuming the more general case where 2η − γη > 0; when 2η − γη ≤ 0, we don’t have the
latter two cases.
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When p < dwη
2−γ , the social net benefit in SM is,
NBSMr =
pw(dw − pw2 )( 1η + η)
1− γ2 N +
2pˆpwγ
1− γ2N. (2.82)
Thus,
∆NB1 = NB
MM
r −NBSMr =
Npˆ2(1 + 2(1− 2γ2)η2 + η4)
2η(1 + η2)(1− γ2) >
Npˆ2(1− 2η2 + η4)
2η(1 + η2)(1− γ2) ≥ 0.
(2.83)
When p ∈ [ dwη
2−γ ,
dwη
2η2−γ ), the social net benefit in SM is,
NBSMr =
pˆ2
2
+ pw(dw − pw2 )
(1− γ2)η N +
pˆ(pw + dw)γ
1− γ2 N. (2.84)
Thus,
∆NB2 = NB
MM
r −NBSMr =
ηN(d2w + pˆ(1− γ2))
2(1− γ2) > 0. (2.85)
When p > dwη
2η2−γ , the social net benefit in SM is,
NBSMr =
1
2
pˆ2( 1
η
+ η)
1− γ2 N +
2pˆdwγ
1− γ2N. (2.86)
Thus,
∆NB3 = NB
MM
r −NBSMr =
d2wN(1 + η
2)
2η(1− γ2) > 0. (2.87)
Therefore, the SM leads to a lower net social benefit compared to MM, which max-
imizes the net social benefit when the regulator considers both carbon sequestration
and water quality improvement benefit and chooses the cap optimally.
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Proof for Proposition 2.7
Second-Best Cap Choice in MM When the regulator cares only about the
water quality improvement benefit, the LHS of equation (2.25) becomes,
B′w (Qw(Ar′))Q
′
w(Ar′) = dw. (2.88)
In the MM, since there is not restrictions on the market participation choices, pˆ =
∂gci(·)
∂ci
= ∂gwk(·)
∂ck
and pw(Ar′) =
∂gci(·)
∂wi
= ∂gwk(·)
∂wk
for any carbon landowner i and wa-
ter quality landowner k. Also, according to the supply functions (2.7) and (2.8) in
MM, we have,
∂ci(Ar′ )
∂Ar′
= γ
N(η+ 1
η
)
,
∂wi(Ar′ )
∂Ar′
= η
N(η+ 1
η
)
,
∂ck(Ar′ )
∂Ar′
= γ
N(η+ 1
η
)
and
∂wk(Ar′ )
∂Ar′
=
1
Nη(η+ 1
η
)
. As a result, the RHS of equation (2.25) becomes,
∑N
i=1
(
∂gci
∂ci
∂ci(Ar′ )
∂Ar′
+ ∂gci
∂wi
∂wi(Ar′ )
∂Ar′
)
+
∑N
k=1
(
∂gwk
∂ck
∂ck(Ar′ )
∂Ar′
+ ∂gwk
∂wk
∂wk(Ar′ )
∂Ar′
)
= 2pˆγ
η+ 1
η
+ pw(Ar′).
(2.89)
As a result,9
dw = pw(Ar′) +
2pˆγ
η + 1
η
. (2.90)
Therefore, in the MM, the marginal benefit of water quality improvement equals
the equilibrium price in the water quality market. The optimal cap choice in MM
AMMr′ =
dw(η +
1
η
)
1− γ2 N, (2.91)
9Assume the water quality improvement benefit dw is sufficiently large so that pw(Ar′) > 0, or
pˆ < dw(1+η
2)
2ηγ .
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and the society achieves a second-second outcome. Note that the failure to recognize
the carbon benefit leads to a lower water quality trading cap in the MM since AMMr′ <
AMMr .
Second-Best Cap Choice in SM In the SM institution where credit stacking
is not allowed, landowners’ could only choose to participate and receive revenue from
one market. According to Propostion 2.1, depending on the carbon credit price pˆ,
landowners’ participation choices might differ.
Specifically, when Ar ≥ (1+η2)pˆN(1−γ2)η2 , the equilibrium market participation choices are
(mw,mw). Thus, the LHS of equation (2.25) becomes,
B′w (Qw(Ar′))Q
′
w(Ar′) = dw. (2.92)
Due to the SM restriction, only pw(Ar′) =
∂gci(·)
∂wi
= ∂gwk(·)
∂wk
hold for any carbon
landowner i and water quality landowner k. Also, according to the supply func-
tions in SM, we have,
∂ci(Ar′ )
∂Ar′
= γ
N(η+ 1
η
)
,
∂wi(Ar′ )
∂Ar′
= η
N(η+ 1
η
)
,
∂ck(Ar′ )
∂Ar′
= γ
N(η+ 1
η
)
and
∂wk(Ar′ )
∂Ar′
= 1
Nη(η+ 1
η
)
. As a result, the RHS of equation (2.25) becomes,
N
(
∂gci
∂ci
∂ci(Ar′ )
∂Ar′
+ ∂gci
∂wi
∂wi(Ar′ )
∂Ar′
)
+N
(
∂gwk
∂ck
∂ck(Ar′ )
∂Ar′
+ ∂gwk
∂wk
∂wk(Ar′ )
∂Ar′
)
= γ
η+ 1
η
(∂gci
∂ci
+ ∂gci
∂wi
) + pw(Ar′)
= γ
η+ 1
η
(
ηγpw(Ar′ )
1−γ2 − γpw(Ar′ )η1−γ2 + γpw(Ar′ )η(1−γ2) − γpw(Ar′ )η(1−γ2)
)
+ pw(Ar′)
= pw(Ar′)
(2.93)
Therefore,
dw = pw(Ar′), (2.94)
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We can find that the optimal cap choice in SM in this situation is
ASMr′ =
dw(η +
1
η
)
1− γ2 N, (2.95)
When Ar′ ∈ [ pˆ(N+η2)(1−γ2)η2 , pˆN(1+η
2)
(1−γ2)η2 ), the equilibrium market participation choices are
(τ1m
∗
w,m
∗
w), which means (1−τ1)N carbon landowners will choose the carbon market
while the others, τ1N carbon landowners and N water quality landowners, will choose
the water quality market. Due to the SM restriction, only pw(Ar′) =
∂gci(·)
∂wi
= ∂gwk(·)
∂wk
hold for any carbon landowner i and water quality landowner k. Also, according
to the supply functions in SM, we have,
∂ci(Ar′ )
∂Ar′
= γ
N(τ1η+
1
η
)
,
∂wi(Ar′ )
∂Ar′
= η
N(τ1η+
1
η
)
,
∂ck(Ar′ )
∂Ar′
= γ
N(τ1η+
1
η
)
and
∂wk(Ar′ )
∂Ar′
= 1
Nη(τ1η+
1
η
)
when a landowner chooses the water
quality market (j = mw), and
∂ci(Ar′ )
∂Ar′
=
∂wi(Ar′ )
∂Ar′
=
∂ck(Ar′ )
∂Ar′
=
∂wk(Ar′ )
∂Ar′
= 0 when a
landowner chooses the carbon market (j = mc). As a result, the RHS of equation
(2.25) becomes,
(1− τ1(Ar′))N
(
∂gci
∂ci
∂ci(Ar′ )
∂Ar′
+ ∂gci
∂wi
∂wi(Ar′ )
∂Ar′
)
+ τ1(Ar′)N
(
∂gci
∂ci
∂ci(Ar′ )
∂Ar′
+ ∂gci
∂wi
∂wi(Ar′ )
∂Ar′
)
+ (τ ′1(Ar′)− τ ′1(Ar′))Ngci(ci, wi) +
∑N
k=1
(
∂gwk
∂ck
∂ck(Ar′ )
∂Ar′
+ ∂gwk
∂wk
∂wk(Ar′ )
∂Ar′
)
= γ
η+ 1
η
(τ1
∂gci
∂ci
+ ∂gci
∂wi
) + pw(Ar′)
= γ
η+ 1
η
(
τ1(
ηγpw(Ar′ )
1−γ2 − γpw(Ar′ )η1−γ2 ) + γpw(Ar′ )η(1−γ2) − γpw(Ar′ )η(1−γ2)
)
+ pw(Ar′)
= pw(Ar′) =
pˆ
η
(2.96)
Therefore,
dw = pw(Ar′) =
pˆ
η
, (2.97)
When Ar′ ∈ [ Npˆ1−γ2 , pˆ(N+η
2)
(1−γ2)η2 ) and the equilibrium market participation choices are
(m∗c ,m
∗
w). Due to the SM restriction, only pw(Ar′) =
∂gwk(·)
∂wk
and pˆ = ∂gci(·)
∂ci
hold
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for any carbon landowner i and water quality landowner k. Also, according to the
supply functions in SM, we have,
∂ci(Ar′ )
∂Ar′
=
∂wi(Ar′ )
∂Ar′
= 0,
∂ck(Ar′ )
∂Ar′
= γ
N(η+ 1
η
)
and
∂wk(Ar′ )
∂Ar′
= 1
Nη(η+ 1
η
)
. As a result, the RHS of equation (2.25) becomes,
N
(
∂gci
∂ci
∂ci(Ar′ )
∂Ar′
+ ∂gci
∂wi
∂wi(Ar′ )
∂Ar′
)
+N
(
∂gwk
∂ck
∂ck(Ar′ )
∂Ar′
+ ∂gwk
∂wk
∂wk(Ar′ )
∂Ar′
)
= pw(Ar′)
(2.98)
Therefore,
dw = pw(Ar′), (2.99)
Substitute in the equilibrium market price pw(Ar′) =
Ar′ (1−γ2)
N 1
η
, the optimal cap
choice in SM is
ASMr′ =
dw
1
η
1− γ2N, (2.100)
When Ar′ ∈ [ pˆ1−γ2 , Npˆ1−γ2 ), the equilibrium market participation choices are (mc, (1−
τ2)mc), which means τ2N water quality landowners will choose the water quality
market while the others, including (1− τ2)N water quality landowners and N carbon
landowners, will choose the carbon market. Due to the SM restriction, only pw(Ar′) =
∂gwk(·)
∂wk
holds for water quality landowner k who chooses to sell in the water quality
market. Also, according to the supply functions in SM, we have,
∂ck(Ar′ )
∂Ar′
= γ
Nτ2
1
η
and
∂wk(Ar′ )
∂Ar′
= 1
Nητ2
1
η
when a landowner chooses the water quality market (j = mw), and
∂ci(Ar′ )
∂Ar′
=
∂wi(Ar′ )
∂Ar′
=
∂ck(Ar′ )
∂Ar′
=
∂wk(Ar′ )
∂Ar′
= 0 when a landowner chooses the carbon
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market (j = mc). As a result, the RHS of equation (2.25) becomes,
N
(
∂gci
∂ci
∂ci(Ar′ )
∂Ar′
+ ∂gci
∂wi
∂wi(Ar′ )
∂Ar′
)
+ τ2(Ar′)N
(
∂gck
∂ck
∂ck(Ar′ )
∂Ar′
+ ∂gck
∂wk
∂wk(Ar′ )
∂Ar′
)
+ (1− τ2(Ar′))N
(
∂gwk
∂ck
∂ck(Ar′ )
∂Ar′
+ ∂gwk
∂wk
∂wk(Ar′ )
∂Ar′
)
+N(τ ′2(Ar′)− τ ′2(Ar′))gwk(ck, wk)
= pw(Ar′) = pˆη
(2.101)
Therefore,
dw = pw(Ar′) = pˆη, (2.102)
When pˆ ≥ pˆ4, the equilibrium market participation choices are (mc,mc), all
landowners will choose the carbon market. Since
∂ci(Ar′ )
∂Ar′
=
∂wi(Ar′ )
∂Ar′
=
∂ck(Ar′ )
∂Ar′
=
∂wk(Ar′ )
∂Ar′
= 0 when a landowner chooses the carbon market (j = mc). As a result, the
RHS of equation (2.25) becomes,
N
(
∂gci
∂ci
∂ci(Ar′ )
∂Ar′
+ ∂gci
∂wi
∂wi(Ar′ )
∂Ar′
)
+N
(
∂gck
∂ck
∂ck(Ar′ )
∂Ar′
+ ∂gck
∂wk
∂wk(Ar′ )
∂Ar′
)
= 0
(2.103)
Therefore, the choice of the regulator cap Ar′ does not matter in this case. To
summarize, when dw >
pˆ
η
, the regulator chooses the cap Ar′ =
dw(η+
1
η
)
1−γ2 N ; when dw =
pˆ
η
, the regulator could choose any cap Ar′ ∈
(
(N+η2)pˆ
(1−γ2)η2 ,
N(1+η2)pˆ
(1−γ2)η2
)
; when dw ∈ (pˆη, pˆη ),
the regulator chooses the cap Ar′ =
dw
1
η
1−γ2N ; when dw = pˆη, the regulator could choose
any cap Ar′ ∈
(
pˆ
1−γ2 ,
Npˆ
1−γ2
)
; when dw < pˆη, the regulator could choose any cap
Ar′ ≤ pˆ1−γ2 , for simplicity, assume Ar′ = dw(1−γ2)η .
101
Proof for Proposition 2.8 The maximal social net benefit from the first best
benchmark is
NBmax =
1
2
(pˆ2 + d2w)(
1
η
+ η)
1− γ2 N +
2pˆdwγ
1− γ2N, (2.104)
which equals to social net benefit in a MM when the regulator maximizes both carbon
and water quality benefits and chooses the cap optimally.
When the regulator cares only about the water quality benefits, the social net
benefit in MM is,
NBMMr′ =
d2w(
1
η
+η)
2(1−γ2) N +
pˆ2(1+η4+η2(2−4γ2))
2(1−γ2)η(1+η2) N +
2pˆdwγ
1−γ2 N
<
d2w(
1
η
+η)
2(1−γ2) N +
pˆ2(1+η2)2
2(1−γ2)η(1+η2)N +
2pˆdwγ
1−γ2 N
= NBmax.
(2.105)
Therefore, when the social planner is only maximizing water quality benefit, the
realized social benefit NBmax is always smaller compared to the situation when the
social planner is maximizing both carbon and water quality benefit (i.e., the first-best
benchmark). Note that if γ equals 0, NBmax = NB
MM
r′ since there is no production
complementarity.
When p ≤ dwη, the social net benefit in SM is,
NBSMr′ =
d2w(
1
η
+ η)
2(1− γ2)N +
2pˆdwγ
1− γ2N. (2.106)
Thus,
∆NB′1 = NB
MM
r −NBSMr =
Npˆ2(1 + 2(1− 2γ2)η2 + η4)
2η(1 + η2)(1− γ2) ≥
Npˆ2(1− 2η2 + η4)
2η(1 + η2)(1− γ2) ≥ 0.
(2.107)
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When p ∈ (dwη, dwη ], the social net benefit in SM is,
NBSMr =
pˆ2 + d2w
2(1− γ2)ηN +
2pˆdwγ
1− γ2N. (2.108)
Thus,
∆NB′2 = NB
MM
r −NBSMr =
ηN(d2w + pˆ
2(1− 4γ2
1+η2
))
2(1− γ2) . (2.109)
Since
d2w + pˆ
2(1− 4γ2
1+η2
)
= 1
1+η2
((d2w + pˆ
2)(1 + η2)− 4pˆ2γ2)
= 1
1+η2
(pˆ2(1 + η2 − 4γ2) + d2w(1 + η2))
> 1
1+η2
(d2wη
2(1 + η2 − 4γ2) + d2w(1 + η2))
= 1
1+η2
d2w(1 + 2(1− 2γ2)η2 + η4)
≥ 1
1+η2
d2w(1− η2)2
≥ 0,
(2.110)
we have
∆NB′2 = NB
MM
r −NBSMr > 0. (2.111)
When p > dw
η
, the social net benefit in SM is,
NBSMr =
1
2
pˆ2( 1
η
+ η)
1− γ2 N +
2pˆdwγ
1− γ2N. (2.112)
Thus,
∆NB′3 = NB
MM
r −NBSMr =
(d2w(1 + η
2)− 4η2pˆ2γ2
1+η2
)N
2η(1− γ2) . (2.113)
Note that in this situation, the realized social net benefit is still smaller than the
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maximal social net benefit,
∆NB′′3 = NBMax −NBSMr =
d2w(1 + η
2)N
2η(1− γ2) > 0. (2.114)
Therefore, in this situation, if pˆ > dw(1+η
2)
2ηγ
, the SM leads to a higher net social
benefit compared to MM; when pˆ ≤ dw(1+η2)
2ηγ
, the MM leads to a higher net social
benefit compared to SM. However, since pˆ > dw(1+η
2)
2ηγ
, the water quality price is not
binding and the landowners will produce according to carbon credit price, therefore,
the SM and MM lead to identical outcome when the carbon benefit is ignored by the
local regulator.
Chapter 3
Credit Stacking Policy and
Landowners’ Behavioral Responses
3.1 Introduction
Environmental credit markets have been developed to create incentives for ecosystem
conservation. Well functioning ecosystems can provide several services simultane-
ously, such as water filtration, carbon sequestration, endangered species habitat and
biodiversity enhancement. Regulatory-based markets require those who degrade such
services to buy or create offsetting credits from elsewhere, such as required by the US
Wetland Banking system under the Clean Water Act (Zedler, 2004). Environmental
credit producers, including farmers and mitigation bankers, receive compensation by
providing one or multiple environmental credits earned from their conservation activ-
ities. Recently, policy makers are debating whether credit producers shall be allowed
to receive multiple payments for credits stacked from spatially overlapping areas, e.g.,
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carbon credits and water quality improvement credits arising the same acre of land
and a single production action. Ecological systems may create such considerations
through a joint production process. In 2010, the Electric Power Research Institute
(EPRI) conducted a national survey to solicit opinions on credit stacking issues. Dif-
ferent stakeholders, including credit sellers, researchers, and policy makers, showed
a growing engagement and interest in environmental credit markets, with mixed re-
actions to the possibility of credit stacking.1 Currently, policy makers often fail to
provide a definite guideline on whether credit stacking should be allowed.2
In this paper, we compare these two policies by allowing producers to respond
to different market institutions through influencing the natural production functions.
With our theoretical analysis, we hope to assist policy design concerning credit stack-
ing, the potential to sell jointly produced environmental credits arising from conser-
vation or restoration of an ecosystem. According to our knowledge, Woodward (2011)
stands as the first formal economic framework for the evaluation of stacking in a sec-
ond best world for policy design. There is an emerging thread of research regarding
the credit stacking issue, including both theoretical and empirical studies, often in a
second-best context (Valcu et al., 2013; Gonzlez-Ramrez and Kling, 2015).
The credit stacking problem is sometimes framed as “double dipping” or “ad-
ditionally”; these terms typically refer to a general problem: whether credit sellers
shall be allowed to sell multiple credit types from the same land,3 and definitions do
1For detailed survey summary, see U.S National Opinion Survey on Stacking Environmental
Credits: Definition, Statues, and Predictions of Wetland, Species, Carbon and Water Quality Credit
Stacking, EPRI, 2011 behavioral Report, December 2011.
2On water quality trading programs, see 2003 Water Quality Trading Policy, Environmental
Protection Agency; on carbon markets, see American Clean Energy and Security Act (CES), H.R.
2454 (2009). However, the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) and the Environmental Quality
Incentives Program (EQIP) allow the sale of environmental credits from enrolled lands. Cooley and
Olander (2011) provide a detailed summary on stacking policies in various programs.
3Greenhalgh (2008) also used “bundled ecosystem markets”, terminology that can be regarded
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differ in current literature. Here, credit stacking means “establishing more than one
credit type on spatially overlapped areas”, a definition proposed by EPRI; double
dipping concerns a situation where a credit producer sells credits in more than one
market simultaneously, and when “credits are purchased, the necessary mitigation
is not achieved because those same ecological values were used up under previous
credit sales” (Fox, 2008).4 Additionality occurs when an action creates an ecosystem
enhancement beyond some baseline (Gillenwater, 2012; Banerjee et al., 2013). From
a producer’s perspective, credit stacking is desirable because a managed ecosystem
can create joint products that coexist in a given management site, while addition-
ality criteria establish sellable credits only for units of ecosystem restored or service
arising from explicit effort to generate output beyond a baseline linked to some other
required compliance conditions. These two concepts focus on the origin and baseline
of credits. Double dipping arises from imprecise standards when accounting for sale
of a credit. For example, double dipping occurs when sellers get payment from dif-
ferent credit types in different markets (e.g., carbon and water quality markets), but
these credits stemmed from the same action (e.g., wetland preservation, restoration,
or creation) that was previously sold or entirely used for compliance with a regulation
(e.g., under wetland mitigation or offset requirements). We view double dipping as
receiving payment in full for a credit more than one time; that is, selling the same
credit twice.
Another dimension of the credit stacking problem is the “bundle issue”. Bundling
or unbundling concerns how the values of different types of natural resources are rep-
as equivalent to selling multiple credits stacked on the same land.
4Double dipping can mean receiving payment from two or more sources in compensation for the
same production decision. However, if aggregate marginal payments equal marginal costs such a
practice may still be socially efficient. We note that while Woodward (2011) uses the term “double
dipping”, his use of that term is consistent with our definition of credit stacking here.
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resented, either together as one unit, or separated out in multiple units (Fox, 2008;
Simonit and Perrings, 2013). Raudsepp-Hearne et al. (2010) present empirical iden-
tification of ecosystem bundles using spatial data in a mixed landscape. Liu and
Swallow (2016) solicit individual preference regarding water quality credits linked to
environmental co-benefits and illustrate a way of bundling different types of environ-
mental benefits in transacting water quality credits. In economics, bundling occurs
when a project receives a single payment for providing multiple ecosystem services.
This issue is more related to specific purposes of mitigation policies. For example, a
wetland conservation credit could include the water quality improvement and biodi-
versity or habitat services. Wetland banking may provide some additional benefits,
such as carbon sequestration, which is often not perceived as included in the “wetland
credit bundle”. If credit stacking is allowed, wetlands owners may receive additional
return from credits for storing carbon. In Florida, the USFWS (U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service) does not allow credit stacking, while in California wetland owners can sell
carbon credits from wetland banking under California’s Assembly Bill 32. Theoreti-
cally, the bundling issue is not a problem as long as all the bundled credits are clearly
defined and the society can accurately account for each type of credit contained in
the bundle. Thus, if credit stacking is allowed, a mitigation program would state
explicitly which ecosystem assets or services are necessarily bundled and regarded as
essential to program compliance, so that credit producers cannot get extra payment
(no double dipping in the sense of double sale) from credits for which a producer has
already been paid in full.
This paper considers the issue of whether producers shall be allowed to sell dif-
ferent credits stacked from the same project (e.g., same land parcel). Producers are
not allowed to sell the same credit twice under any circumstance, so double dipping
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is disallowed since we assume compensation paid for a credit constitutes payment in
full and complete sale of that credit. We do not address the additionality problem
explicitly since we cast the additionality as a definitional or an accounting issue: for
example, in a wetland conservation contract, once the conservation target is clearly
defined and strictly enforced, the extra water quality or carbon credits produced from
additional management effort, if any, should be acknowledged; thus our contribution
leaves whether rules of exchange should treat these extra credits differently than the
baseline credits as an empirical question for future research. We assume distinct
definitions of credits have been established.
Based on the above premises, we analyze how policy towards credit stacking might
lead credit producers to choose different production technology in the long run and
how such choices might affect the environmental outcome as well as the performance
of credit markets. It is expected that credit sellers will alter their behaviors under
alternative stacking policies; to our knowledge, this is the first study to address the
reactions from credit sellers through the influence of technological choices in the
long run. By behavioral reactions we refer to landowners’ technological responses
and change to existing plans, such as the type of crops or the change of a wetland
mitigation restoration plan when the policy changes in the long run, subject to current
production and engineering technology as well as natural constraints.
This paper builds on Woodward (2011), where credit stacking is framed as a
multiple market institution (MM), and a policy preventing credit stacking is framed
as a single market institution (SM). To set a tangible context, we will designate
producers of environmental credits as “landowners”, but readers should recognize
the generality of the concept extends to any producers of such credits. We analyze
a framework where landowners engage in ecosystem restoration and face choices to
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push a managed or engineered ecosystem toward or away from one or more credit
types. While the MM approach is optimal in a first-best world, Woodward shared
a broad policy space under which the SM approach could be socially optimal in a
second-best world. By incorporating the flexibility of the landowner or entrepreneur
to influence a natural production technology for ecosystem services, the framework
may substantially change the conditions over which proposed policies to prohibit
stacking might be in the society’s best interest in a second best world. While we
draw several implications, our analyses follow from behavioral considerations that
concern landowners’ incentives and responses where credit stacking is not allowed.
Prohibiting stacking may cause private actions that lead to less well-rounded
restoration of ecosystem functions. Also, a non-stacking policy may foreclose low
cost production of ecosystem service benefits and desirable spinoffs from a more com-
plete, well-functioning ecosystem. On the other hand, the flexibility to choose a
different production technology may offset the inefficiency from the SM constraint in
the long run as such flexibility may help landowners overcome some of the limitations
brought by the SM. Therefore, it is uncertain whether the technological choice will
offset or magnify the difference between SM and MM. These concerns are of timely
importance as agencies face ongoing decisions to stimulate environmental markets.
3.2 Basic Model
In a general model, we consider a situation where there areN landowners that produce
J types of credits in the market; each landowner i has a technology that enables a
cost advantage in producing one type of credit, type j. The landowners may influence
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the degree to which his or her land specializes in production of a credit type by
choosing the specialization parameter, ηi, thereby altering the relative marginal cost
of producing each different type of credit, which can be observed as altering the shape
of the landowner’s set of iso-cost curves. Let aij be the amount of type j pollutant
that landowner i chooses to abate (or the amount of credit for pollution offsets of type
j that the landowner choose to produce). Thus, the landowner i’s cost is determined
by the production technology and the amount of credits produced. Specifically, we
use gi(ai) to denote the production cost and ai= {ai1, ..., aij, ...aiJ} to denote a vector
of credit types produced. Due to biophysical process of ecosystems (McCarney et al.,
2008; Jackson et al., 2005), a certain level of complementarity exists in landowners’
available production technologies. That is, given a fixed quantity of producing one
credit, a cost minimizing landowner will inevitably produce some amount of another
credit, which establishes a joint production problem.
The total social benefit is additively separable in each type of credit,5 for sim-
plicity, assuming B(A) =
∑
j Bj(Aj), where Aj is an index of the total credits (pol-
lution abatements) that the landowners actually produce. In Woodward (2011), the
production technology is constant, exogenously determined; we will then relax this
assumption so that landowners can choose a different production technology to influ-
ence the production function. Therefore, the regulator wants to choose a cap vector
A or there is a market price vector p such that the net social benefit is maximized:
max
J∑
j=1
Bj(Aj)−
N∑
i=1
gi(ai). (3.1)
5This is a simplifying assumption. Further research could explore the outcome when the there is
complementarity or substitutability in the benefit space between different types of credits.
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The optimal cap A∗ or the market price p∗ can be found from the first order
condition:
p∗j = B
′
j(A
∗) =
∂gi(ai)
∂aij
,∀i, j, (3.2)
where aij identifies the amount of credit type j produced by landowner i. The
regulator needs to have full information on both cost and benefit sides regarding the
credit markets in order to set the optimal cap or regulate the market price. In reality,
the regulator might not choose either target optimally, which can lead to distortion
of credit production.
3.2.1 Allowing Credit Stacking, Multiple Market (MM)
Under the multiple market (MM) policy, the landowner can sell all types of tradable
credits produced from the same land. We assume a landowner pursues the maximum
profit by choosing the amount produced for each type. Given the price vector p, the
landowner maximizes profits:
max
aij
J∑
j=1
pjaij − gi(ai). (3.3)
The first order condition with respect to aij is:
p∗j =
∂gi(ai)
∂aij
. (3.4)
Comparing equation (3.2) and (3.4), the solutions for the optimal choice of production
amount aij are consistent with the solutions in the regulator’s problem if the cap or
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price is set optimally.6
3.2.2 Not Allowing Credit Stacking, Single Market (SM)
Under the SM policy, the landowner can only choose one type of credit to sell. Thus,
the landowner will maximize profit by 1) choosing the type of credit and 2) the amount
of credit to sell, without regard to quantities of credit types that the landowners will
not sell. Given the market credit prices, the landowner maximizes profit:
max
j
{max
aij
(pjaij − gi(ai))}. (3.5)
The decision to participate in market j will be optimal if
pja
∗
ij − gi(ai∗[j]) ≥ pka∗ik − gk(ai∗[k]),∀k 6= j (3.6)
where ai
∗[j] is the profit maximizing vector of abatement outcome conditional on the
producer selling only in market j. Note that the total credits produced could be
higher than the compliance requirement due to the complementarity in production
if the cost minimization of producing one type of credit j would also produce some
“by product” (or abatement) another type k. Under the SM policy towards stacking,
this additional abatement would be omitted from the market addressing service type
k. Advocates of the SM policy may view this outcome as a source of environmental
improvement that is free. Our results below suggest that an advantage comes at the
6Under these ideal circumstances, of course, the MM policy is optimal. The challenging policy
concerns arise when the regulator incorrectly sets the target, due to inadequate knowledge of benefits.
The second-best world may also arise with a missing regulatory market for one or more environmental
services. Furthermore, the regulator may not fully anticipate landowners’ responses ex ante.
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price of economic inefficiency and may even be a counter productive aspect of the SM
policy.
3.3 Landowners Choose A Different Technology
Parameter
In this section, we analyze conditions that might lead the landowners to choose alter-
native technology parameters in the SM and MM policy. We focus on the choice of the
specialization level, which concerns whether a landowner will choose a more balanced
approach or a more specialized, possibly monoculture-based production approach.
3.3.1 Difference in Choosing Credit Production Levels and
Technology Parameters
When the technology parameters are fixed, we only consider the influence of landown-
ers’ credit output on the total production cost, e.g., we assume the cost increases with
the amount of carbon or water quality credits produced. However, the fixed technol-
ogy parameters restrict landowners’ flexibilities to behave in substantially different
ways which, if allowed, could change the shape of the iso-cost curves under differ-
ent stacking policies. Below we differentiate the influence of credit outputs and the
influence of technological parameter choices on the production cost.
The choices of the credit outputs reflect the landowners’ production decisions along
the same iso-cost curve when the technology parameters are fixed. The landowners,
such as farmers, may change the combination of carbon and water quality credits
through the adaption of alternative management practices on the same parcel with
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the same type of crop. Another example is that the wetland mitigation bankers
may choose to produce a different combination of environmental credits on the same
restoration site under the existing environmental engineering plan through the change
of wetland best management practices.7 Note that the choices on credit output do
not involve a change of the location or the project site, the type of the agricultural
crop or the change of a restoration plan.
However, the stacking policy may significantly affect farmers’ potential revenue
from selling environmental credits and they may respond to the policy change by
choosing a different crop type or changing the location of cultivation (e.g., close or
far away from a stream). A wetland mitigation banker may also choose a different
restoration site or design a different restoration plan on the same site that substan-
tially changes the wetland functions under different stacking policies. Wetland func-
tions include nitrogen removal, phosphorous retention and habitat support. Wetland
restorations could generally enhance the functionality compared to existing condi-
tions, while the relative increase of a specific functionality depends on the restoration
plan and often requires the wetland bankers to evaluate the tradeoffs between nutri-
ent removal and habitat support (Adamus and Holzhauser, 2006; Erwin, 2009). The
modification of a natural or created wetland to enhance one or more functions may
negatively affect some other functions. Such activities effectively change the possible
combination of credits produced and the shape of the iso-cost curves. For example, a
wetland mitigation banker may choose a well-rounded wetland restoration plan when
credit stacking is allowed, by reducing the potential maximum carbon credits from
the restoration site and thus reduce the specialization level, in exchange for creating
7Wetland best management practices are often targeted for specific environmental and ecosystem
services, including the best management for forests, storm water management or debris removal. The
change of wetland management practice alters the production of environmental credits.
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more open water habitat for species that do not facilitate carbon storage.
Another example is that farmers may choose to alternate between different crops,
such as corn or soybeans, since planting a crop on the same field in consecutive years
reduces productivity. Crop rotation reduces fertilizer application and generates more
water quality credits compared to the choice of not rotating (e.g., planting corn after
corn). As a result, a farmer’s rotation choice changes the specialization level in the
water quality credit production and the rotation choice increases the production of
potential maximum water quality credits (Arbuckle and Downing, 2001; Schilling
and Libra, 2000). The rotation choice also influences carbon sequestration and soil
carbon storage rates, thus changing the carbon supply (Antle et al., 2003). Therefore,
depending on the market prices for environmental credits, the production technology
employed can change under different stacking policies, while ignoring such changes
could produce biased evaluation of alternative stacking policies.
3.3.2 A General Cost Function with Production Complemen-
tarity
Below we present a general cost function that captures the complementarity nature in
producing multiple types of credits. The market prices for carbon and water quality
credits are pc and pw. We make the following assumptions regarding the cost function.
The specialization refers to a situation where the landowner has a cost advantage in
producing one type of credit compared to the other. An increase in the specialization
level implies such cost advantage further increases. For example, when a landowner
has a cost advantage in producing carbon credits, we assume an increase in the
specialization level will decrease the cost to produce carbon credit at the margin, and
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increases the cost to produce water quality credit at the margin.
Assumption 3.1. gcη < 0, gwη > 0.
Assumption 3.2. gww > 0, gcc > 0 and gcw < 0.
The gcc > 0 and gww > 0 imply the increasing marginal cost assumption for
both types of credits, while the increase of one credit will reduce the marginal cost
of the other credit according to the negative cross partial derivative. As a result,
the marginal cost of carbon credit increases with the amount of carbon credit and
decreases with the amount of water quality credit. We adopt parallel assumptions
for the marginal cost of the water quality credit. The cross partial derivative gcw < 0
captures the production complementarity.
Proposition 3.1. When the market prices are pc and pw, and when gcη/gwη ≤
gcc/gcw, cη ≥ 0 and wη > 0; when gcc/gcw < gcη/gwη < gcw/gww, cη > 0 and wη < 0;
when gcη/gwη ≥ gcw/gww, cη < 0 and wη ≤ 0.
Proof. A landowner’s profit is pi(c, w) = pcc + pww − g(·) is maximized when the
marginal cost equals the market price for both types of credits. We substitute in
optimal supply functions to obtain
 pc =
∂g
∂c
(c(η), w(η), η)
pw =
∂g
∂w
(c(η), w(η), η),
(3.7)
which also hold true when pc = 0 or pw = 0. Holding the credit prices constant and
taking the total derivative w.r.t. η, we have
 gcccη + gcwwη + gcη = 0gcwcη + gwwwη + gwη = 0. (3.8)
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Solving for cη and wη, we obtain
 cη =
gwwgcη−gwηgcw
g2cw−gccgww
wη =
gccgwη−gcηgcw
g2cw−gccgww .
(3.9)
The profit is maximized when the determinant of the Hessian matrix for the profit
function is positive (since gcc > 0 and gww > 0 already hold), thus,
gccgww − g2cw > 0. (3.10)
Since gcw < 0, the inequality (3.10) implies
gcc/gcw < gcw/gww. (3.11)
When
gcc/gcw < gcη/gwη < gcw/gww, (3.12)
according to equation (3.9), we have cη > 0 and wη < 0. Similarly, when
gcη/gwη ≥ gcw/gww, (3.13)
we have cη < 0 and wη ≤ 0. When
gcη/gwη ≤ gcc/gcw, (3.14)
we have cη ≥ 0 and wη > 0.
Proposition 3.1 also indicates that when there is no complementarity in produc-
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tion, i.e., gcw = 0,  cη =
gwwgcη
g2cw−gccgww > 0
wη =
gccgwη
g2cw−gccgww < 0,
(3.15)
the increase of specialization η will increase the carbon credit production and decrease
the water quality credit production. Also, since gcw represents the level of comple-
mentarity, we find that when the complementarity |gcw| < |gccgwηgcη |, wη < 0 and when
|gcw| < |gwwgcηgwη |, cη > 0, suggesting that a moderate complementarity level has similar
marginal effects as gcw = 0; however, a high complementarity may have a negative
marginal effect on the carbon credit production and a positive effect on the water
quality credit production.
Figure 3.1 presents the major insights from Proposition 3.1 graphically. In Figure
3.1, the horizontal axis is the quantity of carbon or water quality credit and the
vertical axis is the market price. The marginal cost curves are increasing according
to Assumption 3.2: gww > 0, gcc > 0. We assume an initial condition (in the short
run) where solid marginal cost curves lead to equilibrium quantities c0 and w0 at
price pc and pw for carbon credit and water quality credit, respectively. The marginal
cost curves for carbon and water quality credits are mcc0 and mcw0. If there is no
complementarity, i.e., gcw = 0, according to Assumption 3.1, gcη < 0, gwη > 0, an
increase in the specialization η will decrease the marginal cost of carbon credit and
increase the marginal cost of water quality credit. As a result, the marginal cost curve
will shift rightward for the carbon credit and leftward for the water quality credit,
which would lead to the new marginal cost curves mcc1 and mcw1. In this situation,
the new equilibrium carbon credit c1 is higher than c0 and the new equilibrium water
quality credit w1 is lower than w0, which corresponds to the result cη > 0 and
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wη < 0. However, based on Assumption 3.2, gcw < 0, the change of carbon credit
will also influence the marginal cost of water quality credit and vice versa. In our
situation, an increase in production of the carbon credits will lower the marginal cost
of production water quality credits, and thus, marginal cost curve mcw1 will shift
rightward to mcw2, offsetting the influence of a higher specialization level, the change
of which will in turn affect the marginal cost of carbon credits, resulting in a shift
from mcc1 to mcc2. Therefore, when gcw < 0, depending on the magnitude of the
complementarity level, the final equilibrium credits c2 and w2 may be higher or lower
than the original level c0 and w0. The results cη > 0 and wη < 0 only hold when the
magnitude of the complementarity level is small, as implied by Proposition 3.1.
Example A commonly used cost function follows the form (Helfand, 1991;
Woodward, 2011):
g =
1− η
2
c2 +
1
2(1− η)w
2 − γcw, (3.16)
where c is the amount of carbon credits and w is the amount of water quality credits
produced by a landowner. The parameter η reflects the cost effectiveness in produc-
ing carbon credit, which is the specialization level; γ = ∂
2g
∂c∂w
captures production
complementarity level. If γ = 0, then there is no complementarity between the two
types of credits, and credits stacking is not a problem since there is no by-product
even if stacking is not allowed.8 In the above cost function, the technology parameter
η is restricted to η ∈ (0, 1). The range of η may depend on the nature (ecosystem-
8We assume that the landowner has no control over the complementarity level, which is de-
termined by the natural production process. Furthermore, since increase γ will always lower the
production cost, while the choice on the η determines the relative cost effectiveness, we focus on the
landowner’s flexibility of choosing a different specialization level.
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dependent) constraints in practice, such as the geographical locations or the crop
choice due to weather limitation. In case of mitigation banking, the range η may
depend on the landscape restoration plans or the available environmental engineer-
ing technologies. This functional form satisfies our assumptions as gcc = 1 − η > 0,
gww =
1
1−η > 0 and gcw = −γ < 0. Also, gcη = −c < 0 and gwη = w(1−η)2 > 0. This
specific functional form also satisfies the condition gcc/gcw < gcη/gwη < gcw/gww.
Figure 3.2 shows the shape of iso-cost curves for a cost function that is consistent
with our assumptions. The horizontal axis is the amount of carbon credit produced
and the vertical axis is the amount of water quality credit produced. The cost level
remains constant along the same curve. Point A is where the marginal cost of the
carbon credit equals 0 and point B is where the marginal cost of water quality credit
equals 0. The solid curve is the original iso-cost curve. This figure represents the
case where the amount of carbon credits increases with the specialization level and
the amount of water quality credits decrease with the specialization level.
In the single market institution, landowners are only allowed to sell credits in
one market. We assume that an individual landowner has no influence on the market
price. Without loss of generality, we consider the production in the carbon market and
assume the landowners who have a cost advantage in producing carbon credits will
only sell in the carbon market. Thus, the problem faced by the landowner specialized
in carbon production is:
max
c,w
pcc− g(c, w, η), (3.17)
where pc is the market price for the carbon credit, g(·) is the cost function. The
η is the specialization level and is considered fixed in the short run. The market
price for carbon pc is fixed, as the landowners are price takers. Since the landowner’s
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production choice for c is a function of the specialization level, in the short run when
the landowner is unable to change the specialization level, the landowner chooses
(cs, ws) to maximize profit for any specialization level η. The subscript s indicates
the production in the SM. In this situation, the optimal supply functions are:
 cs = c(η, pc)ws = w(η, pc) (3.18)
In the long run, the problem faced by the landowner specialized in carbon production
is:
max
c,w,η
pcc− g(c, w, η), (3.19)
since the landowner is now able to change the specialization level η, the landowner
chooses (cls, w
l
s, η
l
s) to maximize profit. In this situation, the supply functions are:
cls = c(pc)
wls = w(pc)
ηls = η(pc)
(3.20)
In the multiple market (MM) institution, landowners can sell credits in both
markets. As before, we assume that an individual landowner has no influence on the
market price for either type of credit. We now consider the equilibrium production in
the carbon market and the water quality market. The problem faced by the landowner
is:
max
c,w
pcc+ pww − g(c, w, η), (3.21)
where pw is the market price for water quality credits since now landowners can sell
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in both markets. As before, we assume that in the short run, the specialization
parameter η is fixed and we solve for the optimal supply functions. In this situation,
the optimal supply functions are:
 cm = c(η, pc, pw)wm = w(η, pc, pw). (3.22)
In the long run, the problem faced by the landowner specialized in carbon pro-
duction in the MM is:
max
c,w,η
pcc+ pww − g(c, w, η), (3.23)
since the landowner is now able to change the specialization level η, the landowner
chooses (clm, w
l
m, η
l
m) to maximize profit. In this situation, the first order conditions
are: 
pc − ∂g∂c = 0
pw − ∂g∂w = 0
−∂g
∂η
= 0
(3.24)
and the supply functions are

clm = c(pc, pw)
wlm = w(pc, pw)
ηlm = η(pc, pw).
(3.25)
Proposition 3.2. In the MM, the optimal specialization level in the long run is lower
than the optimal specialization level in the SM (ηlm < η
l
s) when wη < 0, and η
l
m > η
l
s
if wη > 0.
Proof. From the landowner’s perspective, the SM is equivalent to a situation where
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the pw = 0. Given equation (3.24), profit maximum implies:
∂ηlm
∂pw
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−gcc −gcw 0
−gcw −gww −1
−gcη −gwη 0
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−gcc −gcw −gcη
−gcw −gww −gwη
−gcη −gwη −gηη
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
=
gccgwη − gcwgcη
(−) . (3.26)
According to Proportion 3.1, we can sign the partial derivative ∂η
l
m
∂pw
.
Similarly, when gcw represents the level of complementarity, we find that when
the complementarity |gcw| < |gccgwηgcη |, wη < 0 and ηlm(pw) < ηlm(0) = ηls, the MM
leads to a less specialized production technology with a moderate complementarity
level; however, the MM may lead to a highly specialized production technology at a
high complementarity level. Also, we can infer that when gcw = 0 and there is no
complementarity in production, ηlm < η
l
s.
3.4 Social Welfare Implications
In this section, we calculate the value of produced environmental credits and focus on
the influence of specialization choice on the overall net social benefits under the two
market policies (SM and MM). Assume there are N heterogenous landowners and
each landowner has an initial specialization level η0i. In the short run, the production
bundle (c′i, w
′
i) maximizes the following social net benefit function given the fixed
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specialization parameters ηi0
NBsr = Bc (
∑
i ci) +Bw (
∑
iwi)−
∑N
i=1 g(ci, wi, η0i) (3.27)
where the Bc(·) and Bw(·) are the benefit functions for carbon and water quality
credits, respectively, with B′(·) > 0 and B′′(·) ≤ 0. The subscript i indexes the
landowners AND thus g(ci, wi, η0i) is the cost function for landowner i. For simplicity,
we assume a constant marginal carbon sequestration benefit dc at the market price
pc and a constant water quality improvement benefit dw = pw. Therefore, the first
order conditions imply dc = pc =
∂gi
∂ci
and dw = pw =
∂gi
∂wi
.
In the MM, the landowner chooses credit production such that dc = pc =
∂gi
∂ci
and
dw = pw =
∂gi
∂wi
by maximizing profit according to equation (3.21), while in the SM,
dw = pw 6= ∂gi∂wi = 0 for any positive water quality credit price pw when landowner i
chooses to participate in the carbon market. Therefore, the MM institution maximizes
the net social benefit in the short run (given a fixed specialization parameter). The
net social benefit difference between SM and MM in the short run is
∆NBsr = NB
m
sr −NBssr = dc
∑
i(cm(η0i)− cs(η0i)) + dw
∑
i(wm(η0i)− ws(η0i))
+
∑
i g(cs(η0i), ws(η0i), η0i)−
∑
i g(cm(η0i), wm(η0i), η0i),
(3.28)
where the subscripts s and m differentiate the single market (s) and the multiple
market (m) institution. In the long run, when the landowner can choose the spe-
cialization parameter, the credit production and the specialization level (c∗i , w
∗
i , η
∗
i )
maximize the following social net benefit function
NBlr = Bc (
∑
i ci) +Bw (
∑
iwi)−
∑
i g(ci, wi, ηi). (3.29)
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The first order conditions imply dc = pc =
∂gi
∂ci
and dw = pw =
∂gi
∂wi
and ∂g(·)
∂ηi
= 0
for any landowner i. Also, note that all the first order conditions are satisfied in the
MM thus MM also maximizes the net social benefit in the long run. However, since
dw = pw 6= ∂gi∂wi in SM, the realized net social benefit in MM is weakly higher than
SM. Thus we have Proposition .
Proposition 3.3. MM leads to a weakly higher net social benefit than SM both in the
short run where the landowners face a fixed specialization level, and in the long run,
when the landowners could change the specialization level.
Proposition 3.3 shows that MM is efficient in both the short run and long run.
The SM serves as an extra constraint and creates efficiency loss compared to MM.
Thus, in the first-best world, the MM always performs as well or better than the SM
even when the landowner can choose a different specialization level.
Another interesting question is whether the choice of the specialization parameter
offsets or magnifies the inefficiency in SM in the long run. Let η∗im and η
∗
is denote the
landowner i’s optimal specialization choice in the MM and SM respectively. Then,
the social net benefit difference between SM and MM in the long run is
∆NBlr = NB
m
lr −NBslr = dc
∑
i(cm(η
∗
im)− cs(η∗is)) + dc
∑
i(wm(η
∗
im)− ws(η∗is))
+
∑
i g(cs(η
∗
is), ws(η
∗
is), η
∗
is)−
∑
i g(cm(η
∗
im), wm(η
∗
im), η
∗
im)
(3.30)
If ∆NBsr > ∆NBlr, the inefficiency in the SM is partially offset by the flexibility
to choose a specialization parameter in the long run, suggesting the value of such
flexibility is higher in a world with a pre-existing distortion (e.g., under the SM
institution) compared to the MM. On the other hand, if ∆NBsr < ∆NBlr, the
inefficiency in the SM is further magnified by the flexibility to choose a specialization
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parameter in the long run. To compare the difference between the net social benefit
in the short run and in the long run, we maintain the assumption that dw = pw
and dc = pc. In the SM, the landowners are treating pw = 0 compared to the MM
where pw = dw. Denote the water quality credits produced in the long run and short
run at a price p˜w as w
l(p˜w) and w
s(p˜w), respectively. Note that p˜w is now a variable
representing the water quality credit price and does not necessarily equal the marginal
benefit dw.
Proposition 3.4. If wl(p˜w) > w
s(p˜w), a landowner’s profit difference in the SM and
MM institution increases due to the flexibility to choose a specialization parameter in
the long run. If wl(p˜w) < w
s(p˜w), a landowner’s profit difference in the SM and MM
decreases due to the flexibility to choose a specialization parameter in the long run.
Proof. For any landowner i, we assume the initial specialization parameter is η0, and
define the difference between long run and short run profit ∆pi as a function of water
quality credit price p˜w,
∆pi(p˜w) = pi
l(c(pc, p˜w, η(pc, p˜w)), w(pc, p˜w, η(pc, p˜w)), pc, p˜w, η(pc, p˜w), η0)
− pis(c(pc, p˜w, η0), w(pc, p˜w, η0), pc, p˜w, η0),
(3.31)
where the landowner’s long term profit function is pil(pc, p˜w, ηk, η0) and short term
profit function is pis(pc, p˜w, η0). The superscript l or s indicates if the profit function
is evaluated in the short run or long run. The η(pc, p˜w) is the specialization level
chosen in the long run, which depends on the market prices. In the short run, the
specialization level η is fixed at η0, while in the long run the specialization level η is
optimized given the market price pc and p˜w. Take the total derivative of ∆pi with
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respect to p˜w,
d∆pi
dp˜w
= ∂pi
l
∂c
( ∂c
∂p˜w
+ ∂c
∂ηk
∂ηk
∂p˜w
) + ∂pi
l
∂w
( ∂w
∂p˜w
+ ∂w
∂ηk
∂ηk
∂p˜w
) + ∂pi
l
∂ηk
∂ηk
∂p˜w
+ ∂pi
l
∂p˜w
− (∂pis
∂c
∂c
∂p˜w
+ ∂pi
s
∂w
∂w
∂p˜w
+ ∂pi
s
∂p˜w
).
(3.32)
According to the envelop theorem,
∂pil
∂c
=
∂pil
∂w
=
∂pil
∂ηk
=
∂pis
∂c
=
∂pis
∂w
= 0. (3.33)
As a result, equation (3.32) becomes,
d∆pi
dp˜w
=
∂∆pi
∂p˜w
=
∂pil
∂p˜w
− ∂pi
s
∂p˜w
= wl(p˜w)− ws(p˜w). (3.34)
When wl(p˜w) > w
s(p˜w), ∀p˜w, a landowner’s profit difference between the short run
and long run increases as the p˜w increases, therefore
∂∆pi
∂p˜w
> 0. When wl(p˜w) < w
s(p˜w),
∀p˜w, a landowner’s profit difference between the short run and long run increases as
the p˜w decreases, therefore
∂∆pi
∂p˜w
< 0.
As a result, we find that ∆pi(p˜w = dw) > ∆pi(p˜w = 0), which implies pi
l(p˜w =
dw)−pis(p˜w = dw) > pil(p˜w = 0)−pis(p˜w = 0), or pil(p˜w = dw)−pil(p˜w = 0) > pis(p˜w =
dw)− pis(p˜w = 0), suggesting the difference between profit in MM and profit in SM is
greater in the long run than in the short run.
When the market price equals the marginal social benefit for the two types of
credits, the difference in social net benefits between the long run and short run is
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given by
∆NBlr −∆NBsr = NBlr(dw)−NBsr(dw)− (NBlr(0)−NBsr(0))
=
∑
i(∆pii(dw)−∆pii(0)− dw(wli(0)− wsi (0))),
(3.35)
where the net social benefit is expressed as a function of the water quality credit price
p˜.
Proposition 3.5. If wl(p˜w) + w
l(0) > ws(p˜w) + w
s(0), the inefficiency in SM is
magnified when producers have the flexibility to choose a specialization parameter in
the long run. If wl(p˜w) + w
l(0) < ws(p˜w) + w
s(0), the inefficiency in SM is partially
offset by the flexibility to choose a specialization parameter in the long run.
Proof. For any landowner i, we assume the initial specialization parameter is η0 and
define
∆NB0(p˜w) = pi
l(c(pc, p˜w, ηk(pc, p˜w)), w(pc, p˜w, ηk(pc, p˜w)), pc, p˜w, ηk(pc, p˜w), η0)
− pis(c(pc, p˜w, η0), w(pc, p˜w, η0), pc, p˜w, η0)
− (dw − p˜w)(wl(pc, 0, ηk(pc, 0), η0)− ws(pc, 0, η0)),
(3.36)
where the landowner’s long term profit function is pil(pc, p˜w, ηk, η0) and short term
profit function is pis(pc, p˜w, η0). In the MM, when p˜w = dw, then
∆NB0(dw) = pi
l(pc, dw, ηk, η0)− pis(pc, dw, η0). (3.37)
In contrast, p˜w = 0 in the SM, so
∆NB0(0) = pil(pc, 0, ηk, η0)− pis(pc, 0, η0)− dw(wl(pc, 0, ηk(pc, 0), η0)− ws(pc, 0, η0)).
(3.38)
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Note that the function NB0(p˜w) only gives the net social benefit difference between
short run and long run at p˜w = dw in equation (3.37) and p˜w = 0 in equation (3.38)
and does not reflect the net social benefit difference for all p˜w ∈ (0, dw). However, since
we only care about the comparison at p˜w = dw and p˜w = 0, we can use the property
of the function ∆NB0(p˜w) to compare ∆NB(dw) and ∆NB(0). In the short run, the
specialization level η is fixed at η0 while in the long run the specialization level η is
optimized given the market price pc and p˜w. Take the total derivative of ∆NB
0 with
respect to p˜w,
d∆NB0
dp˜w
= ∂pi
l
∂c
( ∂c
∂p˜w
+ ∂c
∂ηk
∂ηk
∂p˜w
) + ∂pi
l
∂w
( ∂w
∂p˜w
+ ∂w
∂ηk
∂ηk
∂p˜w
) + ∂pi
l
∂ηk
∂ηk
∂p˜w
+ ∂pi
l
∂p˜w
− (∂pis
∂c
∂c
∂p˜w
+ ∂pi
s
∂w
∂w
∂p˜w
+ ∂pi
s
∂p˜w
) + wl(0)− ws(0),
(3.39)
where the superscript l or s indicates if the profit function is evaluated in the short
run or in the long run. According to the envelop theorem,
∂pil
∂c
=
∂pil
∂w
=
∂pil
∂ηk
=
∂pis
∂c
=
∂pis
∂w
= 0. (3.40)
As a result, equation (3.39) becomes,
∂∆NB0
∂p˜w
=
∂pil
∂p˜w
− ∂pi
s
∂p˜w
+ wl(0)− ws(0) = wl(p˜w)− ws(p˜w) + wl(0)− ws(0). (3.41)
When wl(p˜w) + w
l(0) > ws(p˜w) + w
s(0), ∀p˜w, the inefficiency in SM is magnified
by the flexibility to choose a specialization parameter in the long run. When wl(p˜w)+
wl(0) < ws(p˜w)+w
s(0), ∀p˜w, the inefficiency in SM is offset by the flexibility to choose
a specialization parameter in the long run.
Below we use ηss and η
l
s to denote the specialization choice in the SM in the short
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run and long run, respectively, and use ηsm and η
l
m to denote the specialization choice
in the MM in the short run and long run. If the stacking policy changes from SM to
MM when the specialization level is already optimized in the SM (e.g., ηss = η
l
s = η
s
m),
according to Proposition 3.2, the optimal specialization level in the MM will be lower
(ηlm < η
s
m) if wη < 0 and will be higher (η
l
m > η
s
m) if wη > 0 in the long run. Thus,
landowners’ profits and the net social benefits depend on the relative magnitude of
wl(p˜w) and w
s(p˜w), ∀p˜w.9 When wη < 0, since ηlm < ηsm, wl = w(ηlm) > w(ηsm) =
ws, the inefficiency in SM is magnified by the flexibility to choose a specialization
parameter in the long run. When wη > 0, since η
l
m > η
s
m, w
l = w(ηlm) > w(η
s
m) = w
s
still holds, we conclude that in this situation, the inefficiency in SM is also magnified
by the flexibility to choose a specialization parameter in the long run as well.
Based on the commonly used cost function specified in equation (3.16), we assume
the profit function is
pi = pcc+ pww −
(
1− η
2
c2 +
1
2(1− η)w
2 − γ ∗ cw
)
. (3.42)
For any level η, the supply functions are:
c =
pc
1−η + pwγ
1− γ2 , w =
(1− η)pw + γpˆ
1− γ2 , (3.43)
which implies cη =
pc
(1−γ2)(1−η)2 > 0 and wη =
−pw
1−γ2 < 0. According to equation
(3.41),
wl(pw) + w
l(0)− ws(pw)− ws(0) = −(η
l
m − ηsm)pw
1− γ2 −
(ηls − ηss) ∗ 0
1− γ2 . (3.44)
9When ηss = η
l
s, the specialization level in SM is already optimized, w
l(0) = ws(0).
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Therefore, if the stacking policy changes from SM to MM when the specialization level
is already optimized in the SM (e.g., ηss = η
l
s = η
s
m), in the long run, since wη < 0,
ηlm < η
l
s, the landowner’s profit will further increase and the net social benefits will
further increase as well.
3.5 Conclusions and Discussion
In this paper, we provide an analytical framework to study landowners’ responses
toward a policy implementing or prohibiting credit stacking, focusing on a landowner’s
specialization choice in the long run. We are able to compare the landowners’ optimal
specialization choices in different market institutions. Consistent with our intuition,
we find that when allowing credit stacking, landowners tend to choose a more balanced
production technology; when credit stacking is not allowed, landowners tend to choose
a more specialized production technology. The multiple market institution leads to
a more balanced production approach from the market participants. However, our
results also point out when there is a high complementary production technology, this
result will change and the MM institution may lead to a more specialized production
in the long run.
This study focuses on the behavioral responses to the credit stacking policy by al-
lowing landowners to choose a different specialization parameter in the long run. It is
an advancement compared to stylized analysis where such behavioral or long-term re-
sponses are entirely ignored in the presence of a fundamental policy change. Recently,
an increasing number of empirical studies have started to focus on the “unexpected”
outcomes, or unintended consequences brought about by certain policies (Gneezy et
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al, 2011). One of the main reasons a policy often brings limited or even counter-
vailing consequences is that policy makers often ignore agents’ choice and flexibility
which would often offset the incentive which a policy intends to introduce to discour-
age less desirable outcome. Our results imply that the SM restriction will magnify
the inefficiency compared to the MM in the long run, regardless the level of com-
plementarity. We expect the choice of the specialization level will reduce production
of the types of credits which have no tradable markets, moving these environmental
quality dimensions further away from the optimal production, in addition to a below-
optimal production level generated in the first place, subject to the constraint on the
complementarity level in the paper.
It is also important to consider additional benefit from a more balanced production
approach, such as the biodiversity enhancement value. Biodiversity is an important
criteria in assessing ecological benefits. A balanced production function presumably
leads to a more stable ecosystem, which may offer rich biodiversity values which can-
not be realized from monoculture-based practices. Nelson et al. (2009) find that a
higher level of ecosystem service variety also implies a higher level of biodiversity
through spatial modeling. As a result, the payment for ecosystem services of various
types may simulate a higher level of biodiversity as the ecosystem service and biodi-
versity conservation are highly aligned (Polasky et al., 2012). Thus, ideally, we want
to incorporate the enhanced biodiversity value into the benefit function. However, it
is hard to compare the relative value of biodiversity with the value of other environ-
mental credits. Note that if biodiversity can be traded as a credit as well (Bull et al.,
2013), the landowner may acquire extra revenue from a balanced production.
We use carbon and water quality credit as an example to illustrate the credit
stacking problem throughout the paper. The carbon emission has global impact,
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thus, to address the externality problem, we may need coordination among different
nations to form a uniform global carbon price. Since a global carbon market can
be very competitive, an individual landowner may have little influence (Weitzman,
2014). On the other hand, water quality credits often have limited impact, usually
within a watershed. Thus, the technology choice by a single landowner may have a
larger influence on the local water quality market. Our framework does not consider
the heterogeneity in the types of credits and how the choice of the specialization level
would interact with heterogenous credit types. We also maintain the assumption that
the water quality credit price is the same in the short run and in the long run. These
limitations provide opportunities for future research.
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Figure 3.1: The Influence of Production Complementarity.
Note: This figure shows the influence of production complementarity on the marginal cost curves.
The horizontal axis is the quantity of carbon or water quality credit and the vertical axis is the
market price. The marginal cost are curves are increasing for both types of credits. Without
production complementarity, the marginal cost curves mcc0 and mcw0 shift to mcc1 and mcw1
as the specialization level increases, respectively for carbon and water quality credit. Production
complementarity may further shift the marginal cost curves mcc1 and mcw1 to mcc2 and mcw2 in
the equilibrium.
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Figure 3.2: The Cost Curve and the Change of the Specialization Level.
Note: This figure illustrates a general cost function that satisfies our assumptions. The horizontal
axis and vertical axis are the amount of carbon credit and water quality credit produced, respectively.
Point A is where the marginal cost of carbon equals 0 and point B is where the marginal cost of
water quality credit equals 0. There two iso-cost curves that differ in the specialization level and
shows the change from the short run to the long run. This figure shows the situation where the
equilibrium water quality credit will decreases with the increase of the specialization level and the
equilibrium carbon credit will increase with the increase of specialization level.
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